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IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT
FILED
--'--_,_OCLOCK

30

Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180

Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S
MOTION FOR SUM1\1ARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Defendant Idaho County, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(b), moves for summary
judgment as to plaintiffs claims against it. This Motion is supported by the pleadings

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT

-1-

and

~u,·,,acu

on file, and by Defendant Idaho County's Memorandum

Support of

Summary Judgment, the Declaration of Kathy M. Ackerman, the Declaration
of R. Skipper Brandt, the Declaration of James A. Chmelik, and the Declaration of
Counsel filed herewith. This motion also will be supported by the Declaration of James
M. Rockwell, which will be filed and served timely.
DATED this 27th day of September, 2013.
,,4--

;t/

CLEMENT6Ra
..~ -

I

By //;

I

//

rt tt//1/ »

l\tl.;t.NIJlHOLS, P.A.
/1

/;/

E TVEY G. STROMBERG
JOSHUA D. MCKARCHER
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 27, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616

Attorney for Plaintiff Walco, Inc.
David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501

Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.
X
~·-

~9504 and (208) 743-5307

X

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT
FILED
~-~OCLOCK

SEP 3 O2013

Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BRO\VN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 l
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180

Atromeys for Defendant Idaho County
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDiCIAL Dl[STRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

Case No. CV-2013-42360

WALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF
R. SKIPPER BRANDT

vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State ofldaho;
and

SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406, R. SKIPPER BRANDT hereby declares:
l.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a ,vitness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.
DECLARATJON OF
R. SKIPPER BRANDT

-l-

I am now, and have been since March 19, 2007, a duly-appointed or elected member of the Idaho County Board of Commissioners. I served as Chairman
from January 12, 2009 to January 15, 2013.
3.

1n tJ1is declaration, unless the context requires othenvise, "Wako" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
"RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and "proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the

RFP.
4.

On September 11, 2012, 1 attended and presided over the public

Commissioners' meeting at which I voted to approve the RFP for publication, with
responses to be due by 5:00 p.m. on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no person lodged
an objection to responses to the RFP being opened in public on October 15, 2012 and
discussed at the public Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
5.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended and presided over the public

Commissioners' meeting at which I personally opened two envelopes containing the
proposals.

I first opened Simmons' enveJope and announced the proposed base rate

appearing inside.

I then unsealed and opened Walco's envelope and announced the

proposed base rate appearing inside. All three Commissioners, p 1us Kathy Ackennan,
Robert Simmons, Sheila Simmons, Patrick Holman, and Marietta Holman attended the
meeting. No party present at the meeting objected to the proposals being opened and the

DECLARATiON OF
R. SKTPPER BRANDT

rates

announced in public, and no party present requested

any

portion of either proposal be considered a trade secret.

6.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of

either proposal or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.
Among other things, I did not ask to see or see either proposal, did not give either
proposal to any other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either
proposal to any other person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any

other person. 111e first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.
l declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

7-27-13
-------

DATE

DECLARATION Of"
R. SKIPPER BRANDT

-3-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 27, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
Attorney for Plaintiff Walco, Inc.
David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

X

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX) to (20 ) 93s,:,2S04cUfd (208) 743-5307

/I / ___,-!

/J

fB

DECLARATION OF
R. SKIPPER BRANDT

t ey G. Strol}iberg

/
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Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180

Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff,
DECLARATION OF
JAMES A. CHMELIK

vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, JAMES A. CHMELIK hereby declares:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United State::.;, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.
DECLARATION OF
JAMES A. CHMELIK

-1-

I am now, and have been since January 11, 2011, a duly--elected member of

3.

In this declaration, unless the context requires otherwise, "Wako" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;

"RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and "proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the
RFP.
4.

On September 11, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners' meeting at

which I voted to approve the RFP for publication, with responses to be due by 5:00 p.m.
on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no person lodged an objection to responses to the
RFP being opened in public on October 15, 2012 and discussed at the public
Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
5.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners'

meeting at which Commissioner Brandt opened two envelopes containing the proposals.
He first opened Simmons' envelope and announced the proposed base rate appearing
inside. He then unsealed and opened Walco's envelope and announced the proposed base
rate appearing inside. All three Commissioners, plus Kathy Ackerman, Robert Simmons,
Sheila Simmons, Patrick Holman, and Marietta Holman attended the meeting. No party
present at the meeting objected to the proposals being opened and the proposed base rates
being announced in public, and no party present requested that any portion of either
proposal be considered a trade secret.
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6.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of
learning the contents of either proposal.

proposal or to assist anyone else

Among other things, I did not ask to see or see either proposal, did not give either
proposal to any other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either
proposal to any other person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any
other person. The first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

DATE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 27, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
Attorney for Plaintijf Walco, Inc.
David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.
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Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
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(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

WALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff,
DECLARATION OF COUNSEL
vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, BENTLEY G. STROMBERG hereby declares:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.

DECLARATION OF COUNSEL
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2.

I am the attorney for defendant in this matter.

3.

Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an audio recording of the October

15, 2012 meeting of the Idaho County Commissioners produced by the plaintiff during
discovery in this matter.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

DATE

1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 27, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
Attorney for Plaintiff Walco, Inc.

David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.
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SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1-

I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, W alco, Inc. ("Wako"), was one of two responders to Idaho County's

request for proposals ("RFP") for a solid waste collection contract. Walco claims that
the RFP was actually a request for competitive bids not proposals, that its "bid" was
lowest, and that Idaho County wrongfully disclosed Walco' s proposal to the other
responder, defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. ("Simmons"). Walco thus claims
Idaho County tortiously interfered with its prospective economic expectancy and
misappropriated trade secrets. Idaho County has moved for summary judgment on all
claims.

II.

RELEVANT FACTS
Idaho law permits counties to contract for solid waste collection services directly

with a vendor of the county's choice, with or without using competitive bidding. See
Idaho Code § 31-4403(6); Compl. 'II 10. Pursuant to this authority, Idaho County for
several decades has contracted for solid waste disposal services exclusively with Walco
and Simmons, each covering different portions of the County.

In 2002, each firm

executed a separate ten-year contract to provide these services from January I, 2003
through December 31, 2012. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. A, B.) Walco and Idaho County
in 2008 revised their contract retroactive to October 1, 2006 to provide Walco, among
other things, fuel surcharges and an automatic yearly base rate increase based on the
Consumer Price Index.

(See Ackerman Deel. Exs. C and D (two identical recorded

contracts).)

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM
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On July 31, 2012, Idaho County and Simmons executed a ten-year renewal
contract effective January 1, 2013 for Simmons' coverage area. (See Ackerman Deel.
E.) Idaho County and Walco, however, could not agree on certain terms of a ten-year
renewal contract for Walco's coverage area. (See Compl.1'1[ 7-8.) \Valeo thus suggested
that Idaho County put the contract out to bid. (Compl. 1[ 9; see Ackerman Deel. Ex. F.)
On August 7, 2012, in a final attempt to conclude a contract with Walco, Idaho County
sent Walco a copy of the recently executed Simmons-area agreement, indicating that
Idaho County would be willing to enter a similar contract with W alco for its coverage
area. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. G.) Walco rejected the proposed contract and again
suggested the contract be put out to bid. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. H.)
On September 11, 2012, Idaho County approved publication of a request for
proposals (not a request for bids) with a response deadline of October 12, 2012. (See
Compl. '1[ 11 & Ex. A; Ackerman Deel. Exs. I, J.) 1 The RFP consisted of (a) two pages of
general proposal information, (b) 16 pages of a proposed contract with two exhibits, and
(c) two pages of evaluation criteria. (See generally Ackerman Deel. Ex. J .)2 At this
1

Exhibit A to Walco's Complaint is incomplete. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36
should follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.
2

The County's proposed contract contained, among others, three material terms of
relevance here. First, the County wanted to retain the right to implement a "recycling
surcharge" by which the contractor might in the future rebate the County (on a per-ton
basis) for any reduction in collected waste resulting from the removal of recyclable
materials from the solid waste stream. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. J, at §§ 11.2, 11.3.)
Second, the County intended to continue to allow for annual base rate increases based on
changes to the Consumer Price Index. (See id. at§ 7.1.) Third, the County was willing
to continue paying the fuel surcharge agreed to in 2008, provided that the County would,
in turn, continue to receive a fuel credit for decreases to fuel prices. (See id. at§ 7.2.)
DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S lvlEMORANDUM
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meeting, the Commissioners announced publicly-that the proposals would be reviewed on
October 15 and discussed at their meeting on October 16. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. L)
No party objected to the intended public review and discussion of the proposals.
(Ackerman Decl. <j[ 5; Brandt Deel. <j[ 4; Chmelik Deel. <j[ 4; Rockwell Decl. <j[ 4.)
On the October 12, 2012 response deadline, the office of Idaho County Recorder,
Kathy Ackerman, received and time stamped two envelopes containing responsive
proposals. (Ackerman Decl. Cjf 6.) Simmons hand delivered its unsealed proposal at 3:04
p.m., and Walco hand delivered its sealed proposal at 4:53 p.m. (Id. & Ex. K.) Both
proposals remained in the Recorder's office, and Walco' s proposal remained sealed, until
Walco's proposal was unsealed and Simmons' proposal was opened on October 15, 2012
in a public meeting attended by all three County Commissioners, Ackerman, and
representatives of both Simmons and Walco. (Ackerman Decl. g[g[ 7-8.)
At no time during the October 15 meeting did Walco or any other party object to
the proposals being opened in public and the base price in each proposal being
announced. (Ackerman Deel. <j[ 8; Brandt Deel.<][ 5; Chmelik Deel.<][ 5; Rockwell Deel.
<][ 5.) Walco recorded the 20-minute October 15, 2012 meeting at which the proposals
were opened and publicly discussed. (See Deel. of Counsel Ex. A (audio recording of
October 15, 2012 Commissioner meeting).) The recording reflects that, after calling the
meeting to order, Commissioner Brandt unsealed the proposals in the order they were
submitted, announced the base price of each, and asked the clerk to copy the proposals
for the Commissioners. (Id. at time stamp 1:15.) Several minutes of small talk ensued

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S lvIEMORANDUM
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until

clerk returned with photocopies of 'the proposals.

(Id. at time stamp 5: 18

(Cow.missioner Brandt referring to copies "hot off the press").) The Commissioners
reviewed the proposals silently for several more minutes until Commissioner Rockwell
began asking questions about the proposals' terms.

(Id. at time stamp 9: 12

(Commissioner Rockwell and Walco representative discussing similarities and
differences between Walco's existing contract and its newly proposed contract).) The
remainder of the meeting was a discussion of key terms of both parties' proposals,

all

without either party objecting to the discussion occurring in a public meeting and with
both parties present. (See generally id.) At no point did any Walco representative refuse
to answer questions or request that the Commissioners stop discussing the proposals in
the physical presence of Robert Simmons. (See generally id.)
The base prices proposed were $77,202 for Simmons and $87,000 for Walco. (See
Ackerman Deel. Exs. L, M.) Simmons' proposal was one page long. (See Compl.
& Ex. C; Ackerman Deel. Ex. L.)3 Walco's proposal was more elaborate -

<J[

20

but also

proposed an entirely different contract than the one proposed by the County with its RFP.
(See Compl. <J[ 18; Ackerman Deel. Ex. M.)4

On October 16, 2012, at a regularly

3

Simmons proposed a base rate and only one material deviation from the pricing terms
proposed by the Commissioners: an additional per-ton charge for waste exceeding 4,500
tons per year. (See Compl. Ex. C; Ackerman Deel. Ex. L.) Simmons also proposed to
use its own transfer stations, which were not and are not located in Idaho County, where
Walco's transfer stations are located. (See id.)
4

Walco opted to propose a flat 5% per year "cost of living" increase to its base rate in
lieu of fuel surcharges or increases based upon the Consumer Price Index. (See Compl.
Ex. B-15, at§ 7.1.) Walco thus did not allow for decreases in fuel costs and wanted a 5%
cost-of-living increase even if the relevant Consumer Price Index had changed less than
DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM
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scheduled public meeting of the County Commissioners, both Simmons and Walco
discussed their proposals at length and in detail, including discussing material terms of
Walco's proposal. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. N.)
Walco tried to persuade the Commissioners to choose its proposal over Simmons'
proposal. 5 At the October 23, 2012 Commissioners' meeting, a lengthy discussion
ensued about the two proposals, after which the Commissioners voted to enter
negotiations with Simmons. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. Q.)6 On November 30, 2012, the
Commissioners approved and executed the contract with Simmons, to take effect on
January 1, 2013. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. U, V.)7

5%. Most notably, Walco's agreement did not allow for even the possibility of a future
recycling surcharge. (Compare Compl. Ex. B-17, at § 11. l, with Ackerman Deel. Ex. M,
at§§ 11.2, 11.3.) Walco thus rejected all three of the County's material proposed terms
described above in footnote 2.
5

For example, in an October 22, 2012 letter to Idaho County, Walco's attorney asserted
that Idaho County would pay Simmons more than it would pay W alco, in part because
Simmons' monthly fuel surcharge would be "at least $7,900," which he noted would total
$85,102 when added to Simmons' proposed monthly base rate of $77,202. (See
Ackerman Deel. Ex. 0, at 3.) This stood in contrast to Walco's own recent fuel
surcharges for the same coverage area, which had totaled only $11,556 for the entire
quarter ending September 30, 2012, an average of only $3,852 per month. (See
Ackerman Deel. Ex. P.)
6

Negotiations were conducted in public (except for contract drafting between the parties'
lawyers). At the October 30, 2012 Commissioners' meeting, Simmons, among other
things, agreed to increase its annual tonnage cap from 4,500 tons to 4,632 tons before
triggering a per-ton charge. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. R.) The contract was discussed at
the November 6 and 27 meetings, and at the latter of these two, the public was invited to
(and did) comment on the proposed agreement with Simmons and was advised that
copies of the proposed contract were available for review. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. S,
T.)
7

For the first six months of 2013, Idaho County paid Simmons a total of $483,024.40 in
base rate and fuel surcharges under the contract at dispute here. (See Ackerman Deel.
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On January 7, 2013, Walco filed a- Notice of Tort Claim, making the same
allegations presented by its Complaint. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. Y.) On February 19,
2013, Idaho County denied the tort claim and explained its reasoning. (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. Z.) Walco filed its Complaint on March 25, 2013. (CompL, at 1.)
III.

ARGUMENT
Walco claims that Idaho County tortiously interfered with an econormc

expectancy and misappropriated trade secrets.

Idaho County is entitled to summary

judgment on both claims.
A.

Tortious Interference with an Economic Expectancy

Tortious interference with a prospective economic expectancy has five elements:
(1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference
inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful
by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (5) resulting
damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893, 243 P.3d 1069, 1081 (2010)
(quoting Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (2008)).
Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment on several independent bases: first,
Idaho County is not a third party to any alleged expectancy; second, Walco cannot
32-33 & Exs. W, X.) At Walco's base rate of $87,000 per month (with no fuel
surcharges), the Simmons contract has cost $38,975.60 less than the Walco contract
would have cost for the same period. (Both contracts provided for separate payment for
tires, appliances, and tippit"1g fees, so t.1-iose charges, totaling $7,257.20, are not included
in this comparison.) In particular, Simmons' fuel surcharges for the first half of 2013
totaled only $19,812.40 (see id.) - an average of only $3,302.07 per month and nearly
$4,600 per month less than the $7,900 per month Walco "estimated" that Simmons would
charge. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. 0, at 3 (letter from Walco's attorney).)
<J[<_I[
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establish the existence of a valid economiC' expectancy; third, Idaho County did not act
wrongfully; and, fourth, because no expectancy existed after Idaho County's RFP was
published, Idaho County had no knowledge of the existence of any expectancy, did not
interfere with any alleged expectancy, and did not cause Walco to suffer any damages for
the loss of any expectancy.
1.

Idaho County is not a third party to W alco' s alleged economic
expectancy.

A tortious interference claim may rest against a third party to the expectancy, but
not the other party to the expectancy:
Deliberately and at his pleasure, one may ordinarily refuse to deal with
another, and the conduct is not regarded as improper, subjecting the actor to
liability. . . . There is no general duty to do business with all who offer
their services, wares or patronage; but there is a general duty not to
interfere intentionally with another's reasonable business expectancies of
trade with third persons, whether or not they are secured by contract, unless
the interference is not improper under the circumstances.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. b (1979) (emphases added), cited in id.
§ 766B, cmt. b; see also id. § 766B; Joel E. Smith, Liability of Third Party for

Inteiference with Prospective Contractual Relationship Between Two Other Parties, 6
A.L.R. 4th 195, §§ l[a], 2.
Walco's alleged economic expectancy was a contract with Idaho County. As a
matter of law, Idaho County cannot have tortiously interfered with an expectancy of its
own making. Walco cannot state a claim for tortious interference against Idaho County,
because it is not a third party to the expectancy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 766, cmt. b (1979), cited in id. § 766B, cmt. b.
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2.

Walco cannot establish the existence of a valid economic
expectancy.

Walco cannot establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy under Idaho
law because Idaho County was not required to and did not seek competitive bids.
Instead, Idaho County proceeded by requesting proposals, and an RFP does not create a
valid economic expectancy in any responder.
In Idaho, the low bidder in a true competitive bidding process may be able to
establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy, because such a low bidder has a
legally enforceable property interest in being awarded the contract bid upon. See Dana,
Larson, Roubal & Assocs. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Canyon County, 124 Idaho 794, 798, 864

P.2d 632, 636 (Ct. App. 1993). Unlike competitive bidders, however, responders to an
RFP have "no legitimate claim to the benefit of being awarded a contract," i.e., they have
no valid economic expectancy. See id. at 802, 864 P.2d at 640. "At the most, they ha[ve]
a unilateral expectation," and are "potential bidders only," not actual bidders. Id. at 800,
864 P.2d at 638.
As Dana summarizes, id. at 798-802, 864 P.2d at 636-40, when a county is
required to seek competitive bids or inadvertently does so, that county is bound by the
mandatory competitive bidding statute.

See Idaho Code §§ 67-2802 and -2806(2).

When, however, a county is neither required to seek competitive bids nor inadvertently
does so, that entity may proceed by any other lawful procedure it chooses. See Idaho
Code § 67-2802 ("No provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to preclude the use of
procurement procedures otherwise authorized by law."); Dana, 124 Idaho at 802, 864
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P.2d at 640 ("This was not a request for competitive bids, therefore the competitive
bidding statutes did not define the method of operation."). One such lawful procedure is
issuing an RFP. Dana, 124 Idaho at 801-02, 864 P.2d at 639-40.
Thus, a responder to a county's RFP could potentially establish the existence of a
valid economic expectancy only if the county was required to or inadvertently did solicit
competitive bids instead of proposals. Whether an RFP requests proposals or competitive
bids is a question of law: in Dana, the trial court granted, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, summary judgment by interpreting the RFP at issue. Id. at 799-800, 864 P.2d
at 637-38 (analyzing the RFP and concluding, "The RFP here simply was not phrased as
an invitation for competitive bids."). In this case, Idaho County was not required to and
did not seek competitive bids.
First, it was not required to because Idaho Code § 31-4403(6) exempts contracts
for solid waste "services" from competitive bidding requirements. 8 Walco benefitted
from this· exemption for several decades and negotiated in reliance on it for much of
2012. (Compl. <jf<[ 6-7, 10.)
Second, Idaho County did not inadvertently seek competitive bids.

Idaho

County's RFP contained no form of the word "bid." (See Compl. Ex. A; Ackerman Deel.

8

Walco claims that Idaho County was contracting for an entire solid waste "system,"
which is subject to competitive bidding just like public "buildings.'' (See Compl. <[ 13
(discussing a "system's" treatment as a public "building" under Idaho Code§ 31-4402).)
Idaho County's contract has been for several decades, and still is, for solid waste
"services," i.e., waste collection, not the construction of an entire solid waste "system"
akin to construction of a public "building." Competitive bidding has not been and was
not required.
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Ex. J.)9 The RFP requested "proposals",and promised only that the County would choose
one "proposer" with whom to "begin contract negotiations." (Id.) It nowhere stated that
the lowest "bidder" would be awarded a contract. (Id.) Only one of its many evaluation
criteria was cost-related, and even that criterion indicated that cost was relevant in
relation to how dramatically a proposer modified the County's proposed contract. (Id.)
Dana is directly on point. In Dana, Canyon County, after reviewing all of the
proposals received in response to its RFP, opted to contract directly with one proposer for
his personal consulting services, contracts for which, like solid waste contracts, are
exempt from Idaho's competitive bidding statutes. See Dana, 124 Idaho at 796-97, 801,
864 P.2d at 634-35, 639. Because the statute did not require competitive bidding and the
County had done nothing more or less than it offered to do in its RFP -

e.g., it reserved

the right to reject any or all bids, see id. at 800, 864 P.2d at 638 -- the Court held the
County had not violated the statute or departed from its RFP:
The RFP said nothing more than that if a suitable proposal was submitted, it
would merit further negotiations. The RFP did not provide that the lowest
cost proposal, or the most elaborate, would win the contract. Other criteria
were considered. The respondents exercised their discretion and chose the
individual and proposal they thought best suited the County's needs.
Id. at 802, 864 P.2d at 640. Because Idaho County's RFP invite:d proposals and not

competitive bids, the RFP, just as in Dana, "was not a request for competitive bids, [and]

9

Walco has attached to its Complaint, and thus admitted the existence and contents of,
the RFP at issue here. (Compl. q[ 11 & Ex. A.) Walco's Exhibit A is incomplete,
however. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36 should follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part
of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -11-

therefore the competitive bidding statHtes did not define the method of operation." Id.
Walco thus had "[a]t the most, ... a unilateral expectation." Id. at 800, 864 P.2d at 638. 10
For these reasons, Walco cannot establish the first element of its claim because it
cannot establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy.
3.

Idaho County did not act wrongfully or violate County Ordinances
12 and 55.

To establish the fourth element of its claim, Walco asserts that Idaho County acted
wrongfully beyond the fact of interference itself by violating County Ordinances 12 and
55, relating to the 10-year contract term and the location of dumpster sites in Idaho
County. (See Compl.

<J[<J[

19, 28-29, 49-51.) Idaho County violated neither of these

Ordinances, neither of which is still in effect.
a.

Ordinance 12 and its 5-year contract limitation has been
repealed.

Walco alleges that Idaho County violated County Ordinance 12 by proposing and
executing a 10-year contract with Simmons. (Compl.

<JI<J[

28-29, 49-50.) Ordinance 12,

enacted in 1976, was the County's original solid waste ordinance, and it limited solid
waste contracts to five years' duration. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. AA (Idaho County

10

In addition, even if Idaho County's RFP had sought competitive bids, Walco's
proposed contract rejected key terms of the County's proposed contract and stated a
higher base rate with automatic 5% annual increases. Walco's own past fuel surcharges
made its self-serving estimate of Simmons' $7,900-per-month fuel surcharge incredible.
See supra note 5. ¥/alco could not possibly have had a valid economic expectancy,
because it did not propose the lowest price. No matter how many times Walco asserts its
counterfactual position, i.e., that "Simmons' bid was, on its face, the more expensive bid"
(see Compl. <JI<J[ 21, 27, 39, 45, 47, 48), nothing changes the facts shown by the documents
themselves. See also supra note 7 (noting Simmons' costs for first six months of 2013).
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Ordinance No. 12) (repealed), at art: V, sec. 18(A) ("No such contract shall exceed five
(5) years' duration.").) Idaho County has wholly reenacted, with revisions, its solid
waste ordinance several times since 1976. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. BB-DD (Idaho
County Ordinance Nos. 54 (repealed), 55 (repealed), 58).) Even a brief comparison of
each ordinance confirms that each wholesale reenactment substituted for, superseded, and
repealed prior solid waste ordinances. 11 Ordinance 54 expressly repealed Ordinance 12
(among others), and it did not contain any time limitation on contracts. (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. BB, at 1 & art. IV, sec. 18(A).) And Ordinance 58, the currently effective
ordinance, does not contain any time limitation on solid waste contracts. (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. DD, at art. IV, sec. 18(A).) There is no five-year limitation on solid waste
service contracts in Idaho County.
In addition, three facts lay bare Walco's allegation on this point: (1) Simmons' and
Walco's 2003-2012 contracts with Idaho County were 10-year contracts (see Ackerman
Deel. Exs. A, B); (2) Walco did not complain when Idaho County's RFP was published
with a proposed 10-year contract (see Ackerman Deel. Ex. J, at § 2); and (3) Walco's

11

See Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) ("There are two wellsettled categories of repeals by implication: (1) Where provisions in the two acts are in
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier
act."); see also, e.g., State v. Davidson, 78 Idaho 553, 558-59, 309 P.2d 211, 215 (1957)
("The Uniform Act Regulati...-rig Traffic on Highways is a comprehensive statute,
legislatively intended to cover the whole field and subject matter of the operation of
motor vehicles, including definitions of the several offenses growing out of the improper
operation of such vehicles, prescribing penalties for those offenses, and repealing by
implication all acts and parts of acts inconsistent therewith.").
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own proposal was for a 10-year contract (see Compl. Ex. B-11, at§ 2). Idaho County did
not act wrongfully in executing a 10-year contract with Simmons.
b.

Ordinance 55 does not require transfer stations in Idaho
County.

Walco alleges that Idaho County violated Ordinance 55 because Simmons did not
promise to have a "transfer station" in Idaho County, as allegedly "required by Idaho
County Ordinance 55, Section 11, B.l." (Compl.

<J[<J[

19, 49, 51.) \Valeo cites Ordinance

55, which is one of the subsequent reenactments of Ordinance 12 discussed above. But
neither is the current one; Ordinance 58 is the only currently effective solid waste
ordinance. And, regardless, Ordinance 55 never required (and Ordinance 58 does not
require) anyone to maintain a transfer station in Idaho County.
Section 10 of each ordinance addresses "transfer stations" and nowhere requires
they be operated in any particular location. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. DD (Idaho County
Ordinance No. 58), at § 10; see also Ackerman Deel. Ex. CC (Idaho County Ordinance
No. 55) (repealed), at§ 10.) Section 11, cited by Walco, addresses County residents (not
the County or its contractors) and requires them to dispose of trash at "designated
disposal sites or ... available transfer stations throughout the County." (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. DD (Idaho County Ordinance No. 58), at § 11 (emphasis added); see also
Ackerman Deel. Ex. CC (Idaho County Ordinance No. 55) (repealed), at § 11.)
Residents may use one of Idaho County's several "designated disposal sites" without
violating the ordinance. Even if Simmons operated transfer stations several counties
away (or none at all), there would still be no violation of Sections 10 or 11 of Ordinance
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58 (or repealed Ordinance 55), because neither requires Idaho County, Simmons, Walco,
or anyone else to maintain a transfer station in Idaho County.
4.

Walco cannot establish the remaining elements of its interference
claim.

Walco cannot establish the second, third, or fifth elements of its tortious
interference claim. No valid economic expectancy existed after Idaho County published
its RFP. See Dana, 124 Idaho at 800, 802, 864 P.2d at 638, 640. Therefore, Idaho
County cannot have had knowledge of the existence of any expectancy, cannot have
interfered with any expectancy, and cannot have caused Walco to suffer any damages for
the loss of any expectancy.
For all of the above reasons, Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment on
Walco' s tortious interference claim.

B.

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

The Idaho Trade Secrets Act provides for damages for misappropriation of a trade
secret. See Idaho Code§ 48-801 to -807. In Idaho, a "trade secret" is
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use;
and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
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Idaho Code § 48-801(5). 12
The plaintiff in a misappropriation suit has the burden to establish first that a trade
secret "actually existed." Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 897,
243 P.3d 1069, 1085 (2010); Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734, 992 P.2d
175, 183 (1999) ("Without a proven trade secret there can be no misappropriation, even if
the defendants' action was wrongful." (internal quotation marks omitted)). A plaintiff in
a misappropriation suit must also "specify the precise information that it claim[ s] to be
protected trade secrets." Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v KMG Am. Corp., Case No. A05-2079,
2006 WL 2529760, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2006); see also Electro-Craft Corp. v.
Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983) (discussing specificity of

plaintiff's claims), cited with approval in Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 734, 992 P.2d at 183.
A plaintiff must "describe the subject matter of the trade secret with' sufficient
particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special
12

Because Idaho has adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and codified the meaning of
"trade secret," the common law factors listed in the Restatement of Torts are now
"helpful guidelines" that "can be used" to assist a court's analysis, but they are "no longer
required to find a trade secret." Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 735, 992 P.2d
175, 184 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those six factors are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside [Jhe plaintiff's]
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard
the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and
his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in
developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id. (quoting Restatement of Torts § 757, cmt. b (1939)). "All of these factors address the
issue of whether the information in question is generally known or readily ascertainable."
Id.
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knowledge of those persons skilled in the trade." !max Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152
1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
In sum, as to the first statutory element, see § 48-801(5)(a), a plaintiff must

specify precisely what "information" allegedly has "independent economic value," is not
"generally known," is not "readily ascertainable by proper means" by others, see id., is
not "general knowledge in the trade," and is riot "special knowledge of those persons
skilled in the trade," see /max, 152 F.3d at 1164-65.
As to the second statutory element, see § 48-801(5)(b), at least one court has held
that a plaintiff cannot be held to have taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of
information where the plaintiff submitted documents to a state agency that was subject to
a public records law without marking the documents confidential: "[T]he failure to
identify information furnished to a state agency as putatively exempt from public
disclosure effectively destroys any confidential character it might otherwise have enjoyed
as a trade secret." SePRO Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 839 So. 2d 781, 783
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The court reasoned:
The trade secret owner who fails to label a trade secret as such, or otherwise
to specify in writing upon delivery to a state agency that information which
it contends is confidential and exempt under the public records law is not to
be disclosed, has not taken measures or made efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain the information's secrecy.
Id. at 784.

Walco's misappropriation claim fails on both statutory elements: its proposal
contained no information of independent economic value that was not generally known or
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readily ascertainable, and, regardless, it did not take reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of any such information.
1.

Walco' s proposal contained no information of independent of
economic value that was not generally known or readily
ascertainable.

Nothing in Walco's proposal had "independent economic value" and was not
"generally known" or "readily ascertainable by proper means."
801(5)(a).

Idaho Code § 48-

Walco claims that "[b]ecause Walco had been successfully servicing the

unincorporated areas of Idaho County covered by [its] contract for almost 50 years, [its]
proposal included significant trade secret information."

(Compl. <j[ 18.) Walco later

claims that "proprietary business operations outlined in the W alco bid proposal" were
secret. (Compl. qr 53.) These assertions are belied by three independent considerations.
First, Walco attached to its publicly filed Complaint a full, unredacted copy of the
proposal that allegedly contains trade secrets of value to competitors. (See id. & Ex. B.) 13
This necessarily means that Walco cannot argue that its proposal has sufficient economic
value to anyone for any purpose other than in respect of this one solid waste contract.
Else, why would Walco voluntarily place in the public record the very document that
they insist contains "proprietary business operations"? (Compl. qr 53.) One would expect
that proprietary business operations of such economic value as to constitute trade secrets
would also be useful to Walco's competitors other than Simmons -

none of whom

Walco has ever alleged had access to its proposal before Walco attached it to its
13

Exhibit B to Walco' s Complaint is over-inclusive. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36
should follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.
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Complaint. Walco has made its burden tougher: even if it could state a misappropriation
claim (which it cannot), it would have to show that whatever secrets were contained in
the proposal were of value only to, and not generally known or readily ascertainable by,
Simmons -

a competitor who has operated in the same region for several decades

alongside Walco. This is an extraordinary burden, which Walco cannot meet.
Second, Walco's proposal contains no descriptions of "business operations."
Other than the one page containing Walco' s base rate and key contract terms, the
proposal contains highly generalized promotional statements and simple facts about its
business, its clients, its history, and past achievements that Walco believed qualified it to
serve Idaho County. (See generally Ackerman Deel. Ex. M.) Walco's proposed contract
is substantially the same as the publicly recorded contract it executed with Idaho County
in 2008. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. C, D.) Walco should be able immediately to detail
for the Court the precise phrases and sentences that are or were allegedly "trade secrets."
W alco cannot claim it cannot do this or that it must be done under seal, because it has
already placed the entire proposal in the public record by attaching it to its Complaint.
Third, even Walco's one page containing its proposed base rate and contract terms
had no "independent economic value" to Simmons between the time it was submitted to
Idaho County at 4:52 p.m. on October 12, 2012 and publicly unsealed at 3:00 p.m. on
October 15.

14

This is necessarily true because (1) Simmons submitted its proposal at

14

Walco's pricing and terms were publicly disclosed and discussed by Walco with
Walco's consent on October 15, 2012 and further publicly discussed by Walco on and
after October 16, 2012. So that information quickly became generally known and readily
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3:04 p.m., nearly two hours before Walco (see Ackerman Deel.

<_[

6 & Ex. K),

(2) Simmons did not alter its proposal after it submitted it and before it was opened on
October 15 (Ackerman Deel. q[q[ 7, 9), and (3) all the facts that the Commissioners needed
to choose to negotiate with Simmons were contained in Simmons' straightforward
proposal. Walco's proposal simply did not and does not have the value Walco attaches to

it.
Even if someone wrongfully showed Simmons the Walco proposal between 4:52
p.m. on October 12 and 3:00 p.m. on October 15 (which nobody did), Walco suffered no
damages, because Simmons did not need to (and did not) add anything to its proposal to
make it the proposal that accepted far more of the County's terms at a lower price.
Simmons did not need to "rehabilitate" its proposal. (See Compl.

<J[<JI

24-27.) Simmons

had plainly accepted the material terms of the County's proposed contract with a different
base rate and a per-ton charge for waste in excess of an annual cap. And Idaho County
negotiated better terms (i.e., to Simmons' economic detriment, not its advantage) by
increasing the cap from 4,500 to 4,632 tons. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. R (minutes of
October 30, 2012 meeting, noting Simmons' agreement to increase annual cap to 4,632
tons).)
Walco has no basis to claim that anything occurred in secret, at least nothing of
relevance or materiality that could have caused it damages.

Given the facts, the

disposition of Walco's claim simply does not turn upon whether anyone had any secret
ascertainable and thus could not constitute a "trade secret" as a matter of law as of 3:00
p.m. on October 15.
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conversation with Simmons, or showed Simmons the Walco proposal, before the public
opening of the proposals at 3:00 p.m. on October 15. Nonetheless., the Commissioners
and Ackerman declare under penalty of perjury that they had no hand in any such
(See Ackerman Deel. <j[ 9; Brandt Deel. <j[ 6; Chmelik Deel. <j[ 6;

wrongful activity.
Rockwell Deel. <j[ 6.)

For these reasons, Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment because W alco
cannot establish that any information in its proposal was of independent economic value
and was not generally known or readily ascertainable.
2.

Walco did not take reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of any
alleged trade secrets contained in its proposal.

Even if W alco could establish the existence of information of independent
economic value, Walco cannot establish that it took "efforts that [were] reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy," § 48-801(5)(b), because Walco (1) took no
efforts to indicate the existence of any trade secrets contained in its proposal,
(2) repeatedly and voluntarily consented to public opening and discussion of its proposal,
and (3) attached its unredacted proposal to its publicly filed Complaint in this case.
a.

Walco did not indicate that its proposal contained trade
secrets.

Walco' s proposal on its face fails to meet the requirements of a trade secret as a
matter of law, because it evidences no effort whatsoever to indicate the secrecy of
anything inside of it. See, e.g., SePRO, 839 So. 2d at 783-84. In Idaho, as in Florida,
trade secrets can be exempt from public disclosure.

See Idaho Code § 9-340D(l);

SePRO, 839 So. 2d at 785. But the provision of Idaho law that defines a trade secret for
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1Q

misappropriation purposes, i.e., Idaho Code § 48-801(5), specificaUy advises that "trade
secrets" are "subject to disclosure by a public agency" under "chapter 3, title 9, Idaho
Code," the chapter that includes, for example, Idaho's public records law and rules of
evidence. Section 48-801(5) thus places holders of alleged trade secrets on as much
notice as possible that they must take all reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of
alleged trade secrets so that '1.n unknowing public employee does not distribute them.
Given this, SePRO's reasoning has even more force under Idaho law than under Florida
law.
This is especially true for responders to RFPs, because Idaho's public records law
puts responders to RFPs on notice that their proposals are subject to disclosure with only
one exception for trade secrets "contained in" such proposals. See Idaho Code § 9340D(l ). By limiting the exemption only to those trade secrets contained in a proposal,
the law makes proposals presumptively subject to public disclosure. Just as SePRO
reasons, this makes it even more incumbent upon a responder to an RFP to indicate in
writing, and likely on each page where a trade secret exists, that a portion of the proposal
contains specific trade secrets. Otherwise, the proposer cannot, as a matter of law, have
taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of trade secrets contained in a document
subject to public disclosure - especially where the definition of "trade secret" announces
the possibility of such public disclosure in evidence or in response to a public records
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l

I

request. See Idaho Code § 48-801(5). 15 Idaho disallows Walco to retroactively declare
infonnation proprietary arid place all burden upon public officials: to identify Walco' s
"secrets" when Walco did not do so.
b.

Walco repeatedly consented to public discussion of its
proposal.

Walco repeatedly consented to its proposal's public disclosure and discussion
without stating ariy limitations on what information could be disclosed or discussed. As
detailed above, the Commissioners announced in advance that the proposals, after being
submitted on October 12, would be reviewed on October 15 and discussed in public on
October 16. (See Ackermari Deel. q[ 5 & Ex. I; Braridt Deel. q[ 4; Chmelik Deel. q[ 4;
Rockwell Deel. Cj{ 4.) Walco then attended both the public opening of the proposals on
October 15 arid the public Commissioners' meeting on October 16, in each case without
any objection to public discussion of its proposal. Walco only changed its mind arid
attempted retroactively to declare its proposal secret once it realized its strategy (i.e.,
suggesting that its contract be put up for bid) had backfired (i.e., someone else had
proposed a better deal on the County's preferred terms). Walco disliked the conciseness
of Simmons' acceptarice of the County's terms -

15

terms that Walco considered onerous

That Idaho public policy requires this outcome is further evidenced by the immunity
provided to public officials who inadvertently disclose trade secrets in good faith when
responding to public records requests. See Idaho Code § 9-346 ("No public agency or
independent public body corporate a11d politic, public official, or custodian shall be
liable, nor shall a cause of action exist, for ariy loss or damage based upon the release of a
public record governed by the provisions of this chapter if the public agency or
independent public body corporate and politic, public official or custodian acted in good
faith in attempting to comply with the provisions of this chapter.").
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at a price lower than Walco's. But as in Dana, "The RFP did not provide that the

lowest cost proposal, or the most elaborate, would win the contract." Dana, 124 Idaho at

802, 864 P.2d at 640 (emphasis added). Simmons' concise acceptance of the County's
proposed contract did not transform more elaborate proposals into trade secrets.
c.

Walco attached its proposal to its publicly filed Complaint.

As discussed above, Walco attached its unredacted proposal to its Complaint. In
addition to destroying any claim that the proposal was of economic value to anyone for
any purpose other than in respect of this one solid waste contract, it is further evidence of
Walco's utter failure to take any efforts, much less reasonable efforts, to maintain the
secrecy of any information in the proposal.
For all these reasons, Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment on Walco' s
misappropriation claim, because Walco did not make reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of information contained in its proposal.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Idaho County should be granted summary judgment on

all of plaintiff's claims against it and awarded its costs, including its attorneys' fees.

/)

DATED this 27th day of September, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 27, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
Attorney for Plaintiff Walco, Inc.
David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneyfor Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

_x

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -25-

II

i

2
,..,
.)

4

5
6
7
8
9

DAVID R. RISLEY
RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC
P. 0. Box 1247
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-5338
(208) 743-5307 (Fax)
david@risleylawoffice.com
ISB No. 1789
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

11

12

W ALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation,

13

Plaintiff,

14
15
16
17

V.

COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho, and SIMMONS
SANITATION SERVICE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,

18
Defendants.
19
20
21

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2013-42360
DEFENDANT SIMMONS SANITATION
SERVICE, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Defendant SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation (hereinafter "Simmons"), by and through its attorney of record, David R. Risley of

22
Risley Law Office, PLLC, and submits the following memorandum in support of Simmons'
23
24

Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Simmons' Motion"):

25
26
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n/c/plead/rnsj-memorandurn-nhh

1

I.

2

INTRODUCTION

3

Simmons joins in the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Idaho County and

4

5
6

7

seeks dismissal of the Complaint by the Plaintiff, Walco, Inc ("Walco").
For ease and continuity ofreference, Simmons will adopt the nomenclature used by Idaho
County in its briefing.

8

Simmons incorporates by reference much of what Idaho County has argued, and the

9

affidavits submitted by Idaho County in support of Simmons' Motion. This is both because

10

Simmons confirms that accuracy of the facts presented; agrees that there is no dispute as to

11
material facts, and sees no purpose in merely duplicating the presentation ofldaho County.
12
II.

13

RELEVANT FACTS

14

15
16

17
18

Simmons adopts the summary of relevant facts from the memorandum of Idaho County,
with the following additional facts:
1.

Simmons' President, Robert Simmons, denies having access to the

substance of Walco's proposal to the County's RFP at any time prior to the public

19
opening of Simmons unsealed proposal and the Walco sealed proposal on or about

20
21

October 15, 2012. Indeed, Robert Simmons denies having a copy of the proposal until

22

late January of 2013. This was after Walco filed its tort claim and long after the contract

23

was awarded to Simmons. Simmons used proper means to obtain the proposal by making

24

a public records request to the County.

25
26
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1

2.

2

Robert Simmons' affidavit discloses that the preparation of Simmons'

response to the RFP was derived from his knowledge of the trade or business and his own

3

efforts. Robert Simmons was knowledgeable about the solid waste disposal business
4
because of the expertise he had developed in the 27 years he had worked in the same

5

6

business, including 10 years as the manager of that aspect of Simmons' business.

7

III.

8

TIMELINE

9

The timeline of this matter is critical, and needs to be clearly addressed:

10
2008
11
12
13
July 31, 2012

14

15
16

August 7-14, 2012

17
18

September 11, 2012
19

October 12, 2012

20
21

Idaho County revised the contract for solid waste disposal services
for both Walco and Simmons. The contracts were essentially
identical, with Simmons providing the services on the eastern side
of the County and Walco providing services on the western side.
(See, Ackerman Deel. Exs. C and D (two identical recorded
contracts).)
Simmons concluded negotiations with the County for the east side
of the County. This contract included provisions to implement the
County policy on recycling, fuel surcharges (and fuel charge
decreases) and cost of living increases among other provisions.
See, Ackerman Deel. Ex. E.)
Walco rejected the offer by the County to contract with Walco on
the same contract terms (other than base price). (See, Ackerman
Deel. Ex. G and Ex. H.)
The County approved publication of a Request for Proposals
("RFP"). (See, Complaint ,i 11 & Ex. A; Ackerman Deel. Exs. I, J.) 1
Robert Simmons delivered an unsealed envelope containing the
Simmons response to the RFP at approximately 3:00 p.m. Walco
delivered a sealed response just before 5:00 p.m.

22
23
24

25

26

1

Exhibit A to Walco's Complaint is incomplete. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36 shouid
follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.
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1

October 15-23, 2012

2
3

November 30, 2012

4
5
6

January 1, 2013
January 7, 2013
January 24, 2013

7
8

March 25, 2013

After several meetings and lengthy public discussions, Idaho
County voted to enter into negotiations with Simmons. (See,
Ackerman Deel. Ex. Q.)
Simmons concluded negotiations with the County and executed a
new contract for the west side of the County. (See, Ackerman Deel.
Bxs. U, V.)
The new contract for the west side came into effect. (See,
Ackerman Deel. Exs. U, V.)
Walco filed its Notice of Tort Claim. (See, Ackerman Deel. Ex. Y.)
A public records request provided Simmons with a copy of the
W alco response to the RFP. (See, the Affidavit of Robert Simmons
and Complaint, P. 32).
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial filed with District Court.

9

IV.
10

STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

11
12
13

A party against whom a claim is sought may move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in that party's favor. LR.C.P. 56(b). The judgment sought may be

14 properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
15
16

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The facts and inferences which

17
may be reasonably drawn from the evidence are to be liberally construed in favor of the
18
19

nonmoving party. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,469,716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986); Higginson

20

v. Wadsworth, 128 Idaho 439, 441, 915 P.2d 439 (1996). See also, Farmer's Insurance Co. of

21

Idaho v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 544 P.2d 1150, 1151 (1976).

22

If a motion for summary judgment is supported by a particularized affidavit, the adverse

23

party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, and may not rest on mere

24

allegations or denials of the moving party's pleadings.

I.R.C.P. 56(e) and Verbillis v.

25
26
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.I

1
2

Dependable Appliance Company, 107 Idaho 335, 337, 689 P.2d 227, 229 (Ct.App.1984). Failure
to set forth the specific facts will allow the court to grant appropriate summary judgment against

3

that party. Id. Summary judgment is "appropriate" if the facts shown by the moving party are
4
5

undisputed and establish a right to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

6

Motions for summary judgment are decided upon facts shown, not what might have been

7

shown. Id. Further, when a party moves for summary judgment, the opposing party's case must

8

not rest on a mere speculation. A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to create a genuine

9

issue of fact.

Harris v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298,847 P.2d 1156

10
(1992), citing McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d 360,364 (1991).
11
V.

12

ARGUMENT

13
14

A.

Walco Suffered No Interference With Any Valid Economic Expectancy. The law

15

relating to this cause of action is quite carefully set forth in the memorandum of Idaho County.

16

However, while incorporating the County's argument to avoid duplication, there are the

17

following additional arguments.

18
First, consider the consequences flowing from the undisputed fact that Walco rejected the
19
20
21
22
23
24

County's offer to enter into a contract with Walco. See, Ackerman Deel. Ex. G and Ex. H. In
material part, Exhibit H contains the following communication from Walco's counsel:
From: Dennis Charney [mailto:dennjscharney@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 6:22 AM
To: Kirk MacGregor
Subject: Re: Emailing: Letter with enclosures to Dennis Charney

25
26
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1

Good morning,
My clients appreciate the opportunity to consider the contract
proposed by the county. However, after carefully analyzing their
costs, the free services they provide and the recycling issue they
are not willing to enter into the contract proposed. We truly believe
that in order for the Commissioners to· comprehend the level of
service provided to the county by Walco that it is in the best
interests of all involved to put the contract out for bid. If the county
prepares an RFP which sets forth when, where and how it wants
the solid waste contract pe1formed Walco will be pleased to bid
along with any other interested persons/entities. In that manner the
citizens of Idaho county can be assured that they are getting the
best service at the best price.

2
3

4
5

6

7
8

9

10

Sent from my iPhone

Ackerman Deel. Ex. H. (Emphasis added.)

11
This communication documents that Walco rejected the opportunity to realize upon any

12
13

viable expectancy to be the party who contracted with the County. The fact that even Walco did

14

not think it had any special privileges, the benefits of an 'insider,' or some reasonable

15

expectation of economic advantage, is perfectly stated in the sentence:

16

If the county prepares an RFP which sets forth when, where and
how it wants the solid waste contract performed Walco will be
pleased to bid along with any other interested persons/entities.

17

18

Id.

19
20
21

This lack of rational expectancy was confirmed when the County published the RFP,
essentially putting all proposals on an equal footing, with no particular rights for any interested

22

party. No valid economic expectancy existed after Idaho County published its RFP. Dana,

23

Larson, Roubal and Assoc. v. Tierney, 124 Idaho 794,800,802,864 P.2d 632, 638-640 (1993).

24
25
26
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1

If that is not enough, the County's RFP itself stated:

2

The County reserves the right to reject any and all proposals.

3

Ackerman Deel. Ex. J.
4

On the final two pages of the RFP, under the heading "EVALUATION OF
5

6

PROPOSALS" the RFP reads, in material part:
COUNTY may conduct the evaluation process as follows: ....

7

8
9

The County reserved the right to determine if a Proposal failed to
satisfy minimum requirements.

10

11
12

If for any reason during the course of negotiations with the
successful proposer the County determines in its sole discretion
that an acceptable Agreement cannot be negotiated, the County
reserves the right to suspend negotiations with the successful
proposer, contact the second ranked proposer and being
negotiations with that proposer. The County reserves the right to
reject any and all Proposals.

13
14

15
16
17

Id.

18

By rejecting the County's attempt to contract with it, Walco forfeited any special

19

privilege or viable expectation of economic advantage. Instead, it put itself on same footing as

20

any other "Proposer" and the County retained the full discretion to determine if any proposal

21

would 'satisfy minimum requirements' or that any Agreement_ would ultimately be "acceptable"

22
to the County.
23

24
25
26
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{)

1
2

The very rules of the process that Walco put in motion defeats the notion that Walco had
a rational belief that it would receive any special treatment.

All proposers stood on equal

3

footing, and the County had the final decision.
4

5

Second, there is no proof that Simmons acted in any 'vvrongful' manner.

6

In the very recent case of Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. ofAdmin., 155 Idaho 55,

7

305 P.3d 499 (2013), the Idaho Supreme Comi dealt with a similar situation. Syringa thought it

8

had an opportunity to provide services to the state. They knew that Qwest had some meetings

9

with contracting officials, and alleged that Qwest had influenced the state to change the terms of

10

the ultimate contract to Syringa's disadvantage.
11

12
13

14
15
16

The court, affirming dismissal by the trial court on defendant's motion for summary
judgment, set out the following elements for a tortious interference claim:
Syringa alleged that Qwest committed the tort of tortious
interference with Syringa's prospective economic advantage by
interfering with its ability to subcontract with ENA. In order to
establish a claim for intentional interference with a prospective
economic advantage, Syringa must show:

17

(1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy,
(2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the
interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing
termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference
was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of
the interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to
the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 191 P.3d 205, 216
(2008). The interference may be shown to be wrongful by proof
that either: (1) the interferer had an improper motive to harm the
plaintiff; or (2) the means used by the interferer to cause injury to
the prospective advantage were wrongful by reason of a statute,
regulation, recognized common law rule, or an established
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-Page 8
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1

standard of a trade or profession. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
129 Idaho 171,178,923 P.2d 416,423 (1996). The mere pursuit
of one's own business purposes is not sufficient to support an
inference of an improper motive to harm the plaintiff. Id. at 179,
923 P.2d at 424; Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283
Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365, 1372 (1978).

2

3
4

5

Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't ofAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 305 P.3d 499, 508-09 (2013).

6

The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the matter in favor of the defendant
7
8

reasoning as follows:
Although Qwest thereafter had closed-door meetings with the State
and with ENA, Syringa cannot point to anything that Qwest did
during those meetings that would have induced ENA to agree to
the contractual amendment. Suspicion is not a substitute for facts.

9
10
11
12
13

Id. (Emphasis added.)

Walco, like Syringa, has suspicions, but no facts to show that Simmons acted wrongfully

14

m any manner or that Simmons somehow induced the County to deny Walco' s proposal.

15

Regardless, for the reasons stated by Idaho County, there are no facts related to any wrongful act

16

that could revive Walco 's claim, because it fails as a matter of law on several other independent

17

grounds.

18
Walco is quite clearly the party who denied itself any viable economic expectancy by its
19
20
21

own obdurate conduct.
Third, Walco's proposal differed from the County's proposed contract on policy matters

22

of importance to the County.

23

proposed contract and stated a higher base rate with automatic 5% annual increases. If this was a

24

Walco's proposed contract rejected key terms of the County's

bidding process, Walco's response would be non-responsive and could be rejected on that basis.

25
26
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1
2

In proceeding to negotiate with Simmons, Idaho County acted within the discretion reserved m
its RFP to determine whether a proposal 'met minimum requirements' and to choose with whom

3

it believed was amenable to a reasonable and successful negotiation.
4
5

Walco would need to show that it had a valid economic expectancy to enter into a

6

contract on terms dictated by Walco and contrary to the expressed policy of the Idaho County

7

Commissioners. Simmons finds no authority for the proposition that Walco had any right, much

8

less an economic expectancy, to enter into a contract on terms unacceptable to the County.

9
10

Walco's refusal to provide a proposal responsive to County policies and consistent with
the terms of the County's proposed contract was quite enough, under the very terms of the RFP,

11
12

13
14

15
16
17

for the County to determine it could not negotiate an acceptable agreement with Walco. This
reality, and not any occult practice by Simmons, explains Walco's failure to obtain the County
contract.

B.

Trade Secrets.
1.

Walco Cannot Establish That a Trade Secret Existed, or That It was

Wrongfully Used, Prior to the Public Opening of Its Proposal.

Simmons adopts the

18
County's arguments and authorities with regard to the trade secrets claim.
19
20

In general, Simmons adopts the argument and authorities establishing that Walco

21

had no trade secrets relevant to this matter under Idaho law and that W alco has been

22

unable to even identify what it thought was a trade secret. Moreover, Simmons adopts

23

the County's argument that Walco cannot claim something to be secret after publishing it

24

without claim or notice that some part of its public disclosures are 'secret' in nature.

25

26
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1

2

In sum, as to the first statutory element, see Idaho Code § 4-8-801 (5)(a), a plaintiff
must specify precisely what "information" allegedly has "independent economic value,"

3
is not "generally known," is not "readily ascertainable by proper means" by others, see
4

5

id., is not "general knowledge in the trade," and is not "special knowledge of those

6

persons skilled in the trade ... " !max Corp. v. Cinema Technologies, Inc., 152 F.3d

7

1161, 1164-65 (1998).

8
9

Proving a negative (that Simmons did not use a trade secret) is always difficult.
However, the only person who knows what he took into account in formulating Simmons

10

response to the RFP is Robert Simmons. See, the Affidavit of Robert Simmons. Simmons
11

12

13
14

15
16
17

used his substantial knowledge of the trade; his own experience in managing Simmons,
and readily available public information (dumpster locations; Google Earth, etc.) and his
own efforts to formulate a proposal.
Simmons' response to the proposal was not reliant on anything gleaned from the
Walco proposal, which was submitted hours after Simmons' proposal.
Indeed, Robert Simmons' affidavit establishes that the information he relied upon

18

was readily ascertainable by proper means and is knowledge he gained from his skills and
19

20
21

22
23
24

25
26

experience in the sanitation business. See, the Affidavit of Robert Simmons.
2.

Publication of the Proposal Forfeited Any Right to Trade Secrets That

Might Have Been Contained in the Proposal. In sum:
The nature of a trade secret is such that so long as it remains a
secret it is valuable property to its possessor, who can exploit it
commercially to his or her own advantage. Once the secret is
published, it loses its protected status and becomes available to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-Page 11
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1
2
,.,
_)

4
5

6

others for use and copying without fear of legal reprisal from the
original possessor. Therefore, although the owner of a trade secret
does not abandon his or her secret by a limited publication for a
restricted purpose, such as where the holder of the trade secret
reveals it to its employees in confidence and under an implied
obligation not to use or disclose it, or to another business that the
holder of the confidential information has hired to assist in the
manufacture of its product, a public disclosure destroys the secret.
54A Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade§ 1074 (footnotes omitted).

7

8

Walco published its proposal by making it a public document in its initial

9

proposal to the County, at least after allowing it to be opened and discussing it publicly

10

on October 15, 2012. This publication was without reservation of any claim of trade

11

secret. If there was a trade secret, that act forfeited the very·' secrecy' that gives a trade

12

secret value.

13
3.

Simmons Did Not Mis-Appropriate or Use Trade Secret Before or After

14
15

January 24, 2013. Walco's Complaint alleges:
32.
Further, upon information and belief, Simmons
Sanitation requested and received Walco's Proposed Bid on
January 24, 2013 by a Public Records Request. Thus, it
continues to rely on Walco 's proprietary information for its
daily operations and future proposal writing.

16
17
18

19
20

Complaint, p. 6.
The contract between Simmons and the County was entered into effective January

21
1, 2013. Nothing occurred or was even alleged to have occurred after January 24, 2013
22
23
24

until the proposal was unequivocally and publicly disclosed by the filing of the
Complaint in this matter on l'vfarch 25, 2013.

Simmons never received any

25
26
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1
2

misappropriated trade secret from Idaho County or anyone else before, on, or after
January 24, 2013.

3

VII.
4

CONCLUSION

5
6

Simmons complied with the RFP with a conforming proposal. Simmons obtained the

7

contract and Walco did not. Simmons is aware of no authority that merely responding to an RFP

8

could be wrongful or actionable tortious interference.

9

There is no basis for a claim against

Simmons.

10

There is no proof that a trade secret existed or that Simmons utilized it. The only person
11

12
13

who knows what he took into account in formulating Simmons' response to the RFP is Robert
Simmons.

He used his substantial knowledge of the trade; his own experience in managing

14

Simmons, and readily available public information (dumpster locations; Google Earth, etc.) and

15

his own efforts to formulate a proposal. See, the Affidavit of Robert Simmons.

16
17

To focus on Simmons, however, is to miss the real reason why \Valeo failed to obtain a
contract from the County:

18

1.

Walco rejected the opportunity, before the RFP, to have a contract with

19

20

the County on the same terms as Simmons (other than base price).

21

2.

Walco insisted that the County issue an RFP.

22

3.

Walco filed a proposal that could only be the basis for a contract if the

23
24

County would agree to ignore and contravene its own policies on such issues as
recycling, consolidation of dumpster locations and cost of living calculation.

25
26
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1
2

It is absurd to argue that Walco had a valid economic expectancy to obtain a contract on

its terms and contrary to the policies of the County.

It is even more absurd to allege that

3

Simmons' compliance with these publicly announced policies is somehow wrongful.
4

5

Seen clearly, it was not the County or Simmons that caused Walco to fail.

It was

6

Walco's own presumption that Walco was right and the County was wrong; that it could compel

7

the County to enter into a contract on Walco's terms, not the County's terms, and that Walco

8

could dictate policy to the County.

9

The County had the right to choose whether or not to negotiate with Walco, Simmons or

10

reject both. The fact that they chose to work with one proposal over the other is hardly evidence
11
12

13
14

15

of a wrongful act.
For the foregoing reasons, Simmons should be granted summary judgment on all of the
Plaintiffs claim against it and awarded its costs, including attorneys' fees.
DATED this 30 th day of September, 2013.

16

RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC
Attorney for D e / nt Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

17
18
19

By:

20
21

22
23
24
25
26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2

I certify that on September 30, 2013, at my direction, the foregoing A1emorandum in
Support of Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment was

3

served on the following in the manner shown:
4

5
6
7
8
9
1o
11

Counsel for Plaintiffs: (copy)
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, ID 83616
Counsel for Defendant Idaho County: (copy)
Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.
321 13 th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Fax
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3

4

5
6
7
8
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DA YID R. RISLEY
RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC
P. 0. Box 1247
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-5338
(208) 743-5307 (Fax)
david@rislevlawoffice.com
ISB No. 1789
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

10
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

11

12

WALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation,

13

Plaintiff,

14
V.

15
16
17

COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political subdivision
of the State ofldaho, and SIMMONS
SANITATION SERVICE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,

18
Defendants.
19
20

STATE OF IDAHO

21
County of Lewis

) CASE NO. CV2013-42360
)
) AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT SIMMONS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
) ss.
)

22
ROBERT SIMMONS, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes and says:
23
24

25
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l.
2

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness, and

make this declaration on personal knowledge.

3
2.

In this declaration, unless the context requires otherwise, "Walco" means the

4

5

Plaintiff, Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.; "RFP"

6

means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County Board of

7

Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services contract; and

8

"proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the RFP.

9

I am the President of Simmons. I have worked in the business for 27 years, and

3.

10
have been the manager of the solid waste operations for the last 10 years.
11

Simmons is a business that my father began in 1958. Our business includes the

4.

12
13

collection and disposal of County, Municipal and private solid waste in North Central Idaho. For

14

decades, Simmons Sanitation has collected solid waste by contract with Idaho County, primarily

15

in an area comprising the eastern portion of Idaho County. I was the primary negotiator for

16

Simmons in its contracts with Idaho County since contract negotiations began in about 2002.

17

5.

On or about September 11, 2012, Idaho County published a Request for Proposals

18
that involved the collection of solid waste in the rural southwestern part of Idaho County. See,
19
20
21

Ackerman Deel. Ex. J.

6.

I decided to respond to the RFP because I did not know if Walco would make a

22

proposal and I feared that larger companies from outside of Idaho County might respond to the

23

RFP to the detriment of Simmons' business in the future.

24
25
26
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1
2

7.

After September 11, 2012, I began to put together my own analysis of a base rate

to propose to the County in response to the RFP. The other contract terms made part of the RFP

3

were familiar to me as they were identical to the contract, in all material respects, that I had
4

5
6

negotiated with the County earlier that year for services in the eastern portion of the County.

8.

I developed Simmons' proposal.

I was aware of all aspects of the cost of

7

providing such services, because of my years of experience, including, fuel costs, labor costs,

8

equipment needed, and the cost of such acquiring and maintaining such equipment.

9

I had

experience with such variables as weather and the different tonnages expected in remote areas

10

and those areas closer to cities or higher population areas.
11
12
13

9.

Dumpster locations in the entire County are publicly known so that the public can

know where to take their garbage. I studied Google Maps to get the exact mileage between the

14

dumpster sites and our transfer station near Kamiah, Idaho. I personally drove many, if not all,

15

the routes between dumpster locations to identify any factors that would impact the cost of the

16

solid waste and delivery to the transfer station.

17

10.

I knew what equipment, labor force and other necessary tools, products and

18
materials we had, and estimated, based on my lrnowledge and experience, what we would need
19
20
21

to be paid to do this work in a profitable manner.

11.

I used my own experience and knowledge to develop routes to be used in

22

collecting the garbage so as to minimize time and cost while still providing good service to the

23

citizens of the County. I was also willing to accept the County's policy of consolidated dumpster

24

sites, with Simmons' own money being used to provide the labor to build such sites. The likely

25
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1
2

consolidation of some dumpster sites was something I took into consideration as a factor
influencing the cost of providing services in the future. I was also willing to accommodate the

3
County's desire to have a recycling program and the other policies of the County relative to the
4

5
6

provision of this service.
12.

I did not see, nor know any terms of the Walco proposal, prior to the submitting

7

of the Simmons' proposal at about 3:00 p.m. on October 12, 2012. Some of the terms of the

8

Walco proposal were discussed in the public meetings but only on or after October 15, 2012,

9

when the Commissioners revealed our proposal and unsealed the Walco proposal. Prior to the

10
October 15, 2012 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of the Walco proposal; did not
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

seek to see the Walco proposal; did not have a copy of the Walco proposal; did not hear or learn
about the contents of the Walco proposal in any manner; and did not discuss the Walco proposal
with anyone.
13.

I did not see the Walco proposal in written form until after the tort claim was filed

in January of 2013. My attorney sought the proposal in a public records request because I feared
that if Walco did sue the County, that they might also name Simmons.

18
14.

I did not rely on any information from the Walco proposal in preparing the

19
20

Simmons proposal. This was true for two reasons. First, I did not have the Walco proposal

21

before I submitted Simmons' proposal on October 12, 2012. Second, I did not want or need such

22

information. My bid had to, and did, reflect my own best judgment of the cost to Simmons of

23

providing the service using the labor, equipment and business practices that Simmons had

24 available to it.
25
26
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The one factor I was not sure of was the total tonnage Simmons would need to

handle on the west side contract. To protect Simmons from that uncertainty, I included in our
response a provision that additional compensation would be due to Simmons if total volume

4

exceeded 4,500 tons. This was later increased to 4632 tons by the decision of the County.
5

6
7

ROBERT SIMMONS

8

9

IO

SUBSCRIBED

AND

to

SWORN

me

this

_m

day

of
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1I

~-\f'v\-~

NotaryPublici;'i and for the State of Idaho,
Residing in the State of Idah(1 or employed
In and Doing Business in the State of Idaho.
My Commission Expires: _ _ _ _ __

12

13
14
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15

TERESA M. ClilLDS
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State of ldiho

Notary Public
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, 2013, at my direction, the
I certify that on
foregoing Affidavit of Robert Simmons was served on the following in the manner shown:

4
5

6

Counsel for Plaintiffs: (copy)
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, ID 83616

[

]
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Mailed, postage prepaid
Messenger
Fax
Email dennischarney@gmail.com
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Counsel for Defendant Idaho County: (copy)
Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.
th
321 13 Street
Lewiston, ID 8350 l
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DAVID R. RISLEY
RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC
P. 0. Box 1247
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-5338
(208) 743-5307 (Fax)
david@risleylawoffice.com
ISB No. 1789
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

10
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

11

12

WALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation,

13

Plaintiff,

14
v.

15
16
17

COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho, and SIMMONS
SANITATION SERVICE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,

18
Defendants.
19

20
21

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2013-42360

JOINDER OF DEFENDANT SIMMONS
SANITATION SERVICE, INC. IN IDAHO
COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
)
) JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, Defendant SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, by and through its attorney of record, David R. Risley of Risley Law Office, PLLC,

22
and joins in Defendant Idaho County's Motion for Summary Judgment dated September 27,
23
24

2013.
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1

DATED this 30 th day of September, 2013.

2

RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

3

4
5

6
7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

8

9
I certify that on September 30, 2013, at my direction, the foregoing Joinder by Defendant
1o Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. In Idaho County's Motion for Summary Judgment was served
on the following in the manner shown:
11
Counsel for Plaintiffs: (copy)
[ ] Mailed, postage prepaid
12 Dennis M. Charney
[ ] Messenger
Charney and Associates, PLLC
13 1191 East Iron Drive, Suite 200
[v/] Fax
[
;/J Email dennischarney@gmail.com
14 Eagle, ID 83616
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Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.
321 13 th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
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WALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation,
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V.
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COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political subdivision
of the State ofldaho, and SIMMONS
SANITATION SERVICE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
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CASE NO. CV2013-42360
DEFENDANT SIMMONS SANITATION
SERVICE, INC.'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)

19
20

COMES NOW, Defendant SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC., an Idaho

21

Corporation, by and through its attorney of record, David R. Risley of Risley Law Office, PLLC,

22

and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b), moves the Court for an order granting

23

summary judgment against the Plaintiff upon the ground and for the reason that there exists no

24

genuine issue as to any material fact and that Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc., is

25
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
26
DEFENDANT SIMMONS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-Page 1
n/c/plead/msj-motion-nhh

I
2

Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. further moves the Court for an award of attorneys' fees
pursuant to IRCP 54 and Idaho Code § 12-121.

3

Oral argument is requested.
4

DATED this 30 th day of September, 2013.
5

RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC
Attorney for Defe1jtiant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.
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I certify that on September 30, 2013, at my direction, the foregoing Defendant Simmons
Sanitation Service, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following in the
manner shown:
Counsel for Plaintiffs: (copy)
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Drive, Suite 200
Eagle, ID 83616
Counsel for Defendant Idaho County: (copy)
Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.
321 13 th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746~0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
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W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF
JAMES M. ROCKWELL

vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and

SI!vflvlONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, JAMES M. ROCKVIELL hereby declares:
l.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.
DECLARATION OF
JAMES M. ROCKWELL

-1-

I am now, and have been since January 12, 2009, a duly-elected member of
the

County Board of Commissioners. I have served as Chairman since January 15,

2013.
3.

In this declaration, unless the context requires otherwise, "Walco" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
"RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and "proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the
RFP.
On September 11, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners' meeting at
which I voted to approve the RFP for publication, with responses to be due by 5:00 p.m.
on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no person lodged an objection to responses to the
RFP being opened in public on October 15, 2012 and discussed at the public
Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
5.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners'

meeting at which Commissioner Brandt opened two envelopes containing the proposals.
He first opened Simmons' envelope and announced the proposed base rate appearing
inside. He then unsealed and opened Wako's envelope and announced the proposed base
rate appearing inside. All three Commissioners, plus Kathy Ackerman, Robert Simmons,
Sheila Simmons, Patrick Holman, and Marietta Holman attended the meeting. No party
present at the meeting objected to the proposals being opened and the proposed base rates

DECLARA TlON OF
JAMES M. ROCKWELL

-2-

announced in public, and no party present requested that any portion

either

proposal be considered a trade secret.

6.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of

either proposal or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.
Among other things, I did not ask to see or see either proposal, did not give either
proposal to any other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either
proposal to any other person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any
other person. The first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.
I declare 1mder penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

DATE

DECLARATlON OF
JAMES M. ROCKWELL

J~lM.R

-3-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 30, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates; PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616

Attorney for PlaintiffWalco, Inc.
David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501

Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

_x
_x_

DECLARATION OF
JAMES M. ROCKWELL

U.S.MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX) to (208) 938-9504 and (208) 743-5307
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DENNIS M, CHARNEY ISB# 4610
CHARNEY AND ASSOCIATES, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Dr., Ste. #200
Eagle, ID 83616
Telephone: (208) 246-8850
Facsimile: (208) 938-9504
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
W ALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
V.

COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political subdivision
of the State ofldaho, and
SIMivfONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC.,

an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

__________

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 42360

PLAINTIFF'S RJ!tPLY TO COUNTY
OF IDAHO'S O:PPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
CONTINUE AND PLAINTIFF'S
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PROTECTIVE ORDER

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
If further 9iscoveiy will reveal facts essential to justify the plaintiff's opposition to a
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court has the discretion to grant a continuance.
Idaho County opposes a continuance beoause of its concerns that Walco has not made clear what
information it seeks nor how any additional discovery- would preclude summary judgment. 'Irus
reply and an additional affidavit of Dennis M. Charney will alleviate the County's concerns and
does offer additional support for a continuance with regard to Idaho County's motion for summary

judgment, In sum, W alco opposes summary judgment because substantial and numerous genuine
issues as to material facts preclude summary judgment. Because Simmons Sanitation joins with

·.ru l'LAINTU:r.~·,~
MOTTION TO CONTINUE AND PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 1\10TION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER-I
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Idaho County in both the summary judgment and the recent opposition to continuance, Walco will

respond in kind to both in the same document for the Court's convenience. Additionally, a.
protective orderis unnecessary because no order limits discovery through November 2013.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. The legal standard uude:r Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is not tanta:mount to an
opposition of summary judgment.
Walco, generaUy, agrees with the County's analysis of the legal standard required under
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f). It does, however, find that the County's interpretation is
more burdensome than case law supports when it advocates that a full legal and factual analysis
must be asseited in order to gain a continuance. It requests that W alco "provide a legal analysis
disputing the movant' s analysis, submitting affidavits stating its own facts ..., and-<mly thenindicating what further facts could preclude summary judgment." Given that analysis, Defendants
both requites Walco to submit its opposition to summary judgment given the facts at hand and then
detail what additional facts it ne~ds. Yet case law does not go this far. Rather, Walco has the
burden of proving that disputed material facts would successfully oppose the County's summaiy

judgment arguments and that those missing disputed material facts are more than likely available
by way of discovery.
II. Walco seeks additional time only as to the Trade Secret claim.
To begin, Walco does not need additional facts to oppose the County's tortious interference

arguments. Rather, it seeks additional material facts to support its contention that summary
judgment is not appropriate for deciding the claim that Idaho County and Simmons
misappropriated Walco)s trade secrets. It should be noted early that both defendants cite to Florida
case law regarding alleged public records statutes that require entities to mark which documents
and the parts of documents that should be protected. Without such marking, both defendants argue,
.Jt'LAJJ.l'l .iJJ..E'.t'"i:, ~.t'"L)'. Ji V V~.l'Ll"4JJ.JAN 1,Y v.r.rv.:,.1t11v1'si 11. V .t"Li-Ul''<I 11.[<.l'"~
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Walco should not have expected any protection. The Florida cases cited to do not speak to public
records exemptions for sealed bids and proposals, In fact, although much less protective than Idaho

law, in Florida, sealed bids and proposals submitted to agencies are exempt from disclosure as
public records until the agency provides a notice of a decision or intended decision or within 10
days after bid or proposal opening, whichever is earlier. Thus, it provides temporary protection.
(Florida Code § 119.071 available at http://www.flsenate.gov/laws/statutes/2011/119.071). Idaho
law nor case law, however, specifies any like timeframe for RFP and bid protection, and thus
appears to provide long tenn protection for sealed bids and requests for proposals. Either way, both
sets of laws protect bidders in ways that Idaho County and Simmons failed to do. Additionally,
Simmons, himself, requested trade secret protection as to his bid during the public hearings, so he,
in turn understood the importance of protecting proprietary information and what defined a trade
secret in a bid proposal,( October 26, 2012 meeting, time section 33.27, Charney Declaration). By
negotiating with the County based on the RFP that Walco submitted, Simmons, likewise
misappropriated Walco's proprietary info1mation. This issue is discussed in more detail below.
W alco seeks additional facts to prove that he did indeed gain this information from the County.

The phone calls that took place the day of the bid openings are very important because h1.r.
Simmons was not at the meeting wherein the bids were open. Certainly, as noted in the recording
for that meeting, Walco was not afforded those 41 minutes to discuss its own bid with the County,
and it certainly wasn't allowed to do so in secret.
Ill. Idaho public disclosure laws put Idaho County and Si:mmo:ns on notice that trade secrets
in requests for proposals a:re exempt from disclosure.
A. Idaho law defines protected trade secrets as bids and RFP responses.

Defendants argue that Walco has not identified any trade secrets in the Complaint, much
less to Idaho County or to Simmons such that any entity knows what Walco wanted protected. In
rLAli"'i .u.rr -~ K~rL .li'. .n. u VJ1i.11'~r>4.UAl"! 1;:,· vrrv;:,111VJ.""< JI. v
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fact, counsel for both parties noted the two relevant sections of code that relate to this complaint,
thus they recognize that it is Walco's bid infor1natioii that was in question. Idaho Code§ 9-340(D)

part 1, noted in both memorandums for Defendants, specifies, "The following records are ex.em.pt
from disclosure: (1) Trade secrets including those contained in response to . , . requests for
proposal." That statute continues as follows;
'Trade secrets 11 as used in this section means infonnation, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer program, device, method,
1

technique, process, or unpublished or in progress research that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
In order to prevail in a misappropriation action under the Idaho Trade Secrets Act (ITSA), the

plaintiff must show that a trade secret actually existed. Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726,
735, 992 P.2d 175, 184 (1999), In Basic American, the Idaho Supreme Court looked to the
Restatement for six. factors that can be used to show that given information is a trade secret: (1) the
extent to which the information is known outside [the plaintiffs] business; (2) the extent to which it
is known by employees and others involved

ju

the business; (3) .the extent of measures taken by

him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and his
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the infonnation;
and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated
by others. Id. (quoting Restatement of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939)) (alteration in original). All of

these factors address the issue of whether the inf01mation in question was generally known or
readily ascertainable. Id.

.t'LAli'U.l..t<Jl.1 -~ Jt<.JJ,rL .Ii 1 U V~J:'~l'UYAf~ .11 i.Y V.r'r'O~U. .lVl'"< .m. U rLAli'IUlJl.1.Jl.1 '.:;
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B. Wako has defined what trade secrets it believes were :misappropriated.
Walco has made clear in its Complaint that the information that was specific and unique to
its bid that are the trade secrets in question. Idaho courts have long approved the use of the

Restatement factors as to defining and proving a trade secret as noted in Basic Am. v. Shatila, 133
Idaho 726, 735 (Idaho 1999). Restatement of Torts§ 759, cmt. b explains, "Examples of [such]

information .. , include , , , the state of one's accounts, the amount of his bid for a contract, his
sources of supply, his plans for expansion or retrenchment, and the like. There are no limitations as
to the type of information included except that it relate to [secret or confidential] matters in the
bus:iness."
C. Walco seeks facts that will prove material facts exist tllat disprove Defendants'
~ontentions that the trade secrets invaluable and easy to attain elsewhere.
To prove that proprietary information was in Walco's RFP, and that that same information

was valuable and misappropriated) it is of utmost importance that Walco provide all available facts
that show the bidding process itself was flawed. It was so flawed that it allowed the County and
Simmons to misappropriate bid information under the guise of negotiating out in the open. To
begin, the RFP was presented as a Type B competitive bid but handled like a Type A competitive
bid, thereby, favoring those respondents who knew it would be handled like a Type A bid rather
than a Type B bid. The defendants have both argued that this was not a competitive bidding
situation where Type A and Type B matter, but Walco has the facts to prove thls was clearly a

competitive bidding situation. For instance, while the County believes Dana/ is on point, that case
actually firmly supports Walco's contentions. Consider the following comparison in Dana:
Implicit in the definition of a..'l RFP is the underlying rationale that, itt some
types of competitive procurement, the agency may desire an ultimate goal
1

Dana v. Bd: of Comm'Rs, 124 Idaho 794, 795-802 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
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but cannot specifically tell the offerors how to perfo1m tO\vard achieving that
goal; thus, a ready distinction arises betvveen an RFP and an ["invitation for
bids, 11 or IFB]. Typically, an IFB is rigid and identifies the solution to the
problem. By definition, the invitation specifically defines the scope of the
work required by soliciting bids responsive to detailed plans and
specifications set forth. On the contraiy> an RFP is flexible, identifies the
problem, and requests a solution. Consideration of a response to an IFB is
controlled by cost, that is, the lowest and best bid ..

Of import, the commissioners themselves have argued in public that the bidding was sealed and
that they chose the lowest bidder. The RFP itself was very detailed, And beyond the specifications
in the RFP, the process proved the process was competitive as Dana pointed out is often the case
with RFP's (Id.). In fact, dming the first hearing on October 16, 2012, the commissioners wonder
out loud why Walco submitted a different contract than the one attached to the RFP specifications
and stated that Walco had not complied with what the county asked for by submitting a different
contract and terms. Additional facts prove that this was a competitive bidding situation, but again,
Walco's burden is not to prove it has some admissible facts but that it needs additional facts,
Because the summary for judgment included affidavits and arguments stating that a competitive
bid had not taken place, but statements made by the commissioners during meetings and during
news interviews, say otherwise, Walco needs to clarify those statements with the commissioners
during depositions in order to best present its factual arguments in opposition to summary
judgment.
By stating that a detailed, complete bid was necessary and that thi::: contract included with
the bid was an example of past bids, the County presented bidders with the expectation that the bid
was to be complete in all respects. Those bids that were complete, would then enter into a second
phase where the County would decide, based on a variety of factors, which bidder best met the
needs of the county. An analysis of this type of bid ammgement is explained in Hillside
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Landscape Constr., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 750,.750-754 (Idaho 2011). While it is
true that the County was not required to solicit competitive bids, it did so and in doing so should
have selected either a Type A or Type B procedure under LC. § 67-2805.

Walco responded to the RFP with a very detailed bid that included a rewritten contract-in
some key ways more detailed than the example included in the RFP with respect to certain terms

such as tonnage, fuel caps, recycling and cost of living adjustments. The final price Walco bid was
the total it would talce to offer the entirety of the services noted in its proposal.
Simmons, however, simply stated a base price, saying he would agree to the tenns of the

contract included in the RFP. The glaring problem is that contract left out many services that are
costly to provide, and it did not assign numbers to other listed services. So, Simmons and Walco

presented two very different responses to the RFP. Simmons provided a Type A response, Walco
presented a Type B response. Walco, by nature of including all possible costs and by running an incounty transfer station that Simmons did not propose, bid a higher amount than Simmons.

However, the County chose Simmons' contract before Simmons gave a bid that was complete with
all costs. And the County declared that it did so because Simmons' was the lowest bid.
The question that initially looms, then, is why did they respond differently? Simmons did
not respond as the RFP actually requested a response be made. Walco did. IfWalco proves that the

facts do indeed support that Simmons and the County agreed to proceed under a Type A bid, but
W alco was not privy to this understanding, then Walco lays a foundation for its argument that both
entities waited for Walco's final and detailed numbers-that are trade secrets- before finalizing
those very same terms in Simmons' contract. This proves that material fact exists as to whether
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Walco's trade secrets were valuable to not only Walco, but to the County and to Simmons.2 It also

proves that 'Vvithout a flawed bid process, Simmons nor the County could have acquired or
duplicated the infonnation. This, alone, would defeat dismissal by summmy judgment. Defendants
have argued the bid information was invaluable and easily known to all. Walco would like to
bolster the evidence it already has, that the bid information was valuable, sought after, and relied
upon-all under protest byWalco. Walco's own protest is noted below.

C. Wako seeks facts that will disprove Defendants' contentions that neither
Defendants lrnew Walco had any trade secrets to protect.
The County

and Simmons were put on notice that W alco wanted its RFP contents protected

and disregarded Walco's opposition to the negotiations occurring in public, While one
commissioner took it upon himself to provide the Idaho County newspaper and other community
members with the specifics of Walco's bid, in fact, Walco had protested to its bid being made
public when the negotiations amounted to picking apart the bid and then asking Simmons to
underbid in each category. Secondly, Walco had previously requested by letter on June 7, 2012 to
the County that its proprietary infonna~on in a bid proposal be kept secret. Finally, Simmons
himself was at the October 16, 2012 meeting wherein Walco raised objections to the way their bid
information was being used and Simmons himself requested executive session meetings in order to
protect bis own trade secrets. Walco would prefer to depose Simmons to learn facts regarding his
knowledge of the definition of trade secrets and the point at which he became knowledgeable that
Walco's bid specifics was not for open discussion. This is important to establish his role in
misappropriating the trade secrets and to establish material facts exist as to assertions made in bis
affidavit ai.1d summary judgment memorandum.
2

The opposition has already correctly noted that both lowest bidders and potential
bidders have a valuable property interest, but this basis of value is different than that in a
Trade Secret Claim.
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CONCLUSION

In a trade secrets case involving PepsiCo some years ago, the District Court in Illinois
opined what proves that trade secrets cases have not changed over time;
It is frequently true in trade secret cases that 'misappropriation and misuse can
rarely be proved by convincing direct evidence. In most cases, plaintiffs [like
PepsiCo] must construct a web of perhaps ambiguous circumstantial evidence
from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which convince him that it is
more probable than not that what plaintiffs allege happened did in fact take
place. Against this often delicate construct of circumstantial evidence there
frequently must be balanced defendants and defendants' witnesses who
directly deny everything." Si Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244,
1261 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F.
Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated, 184 U.S.P.Q. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
3
(vacating earlier order and substituting more definite injunctive relief)).
Certainly, here, Plaintiffs have evidence that is convincing. But in some respects, more

information is needed through direct questioning. Plaintiffs have the right, with the Discovery
phase yet open, to depose the Commisioners and Simmons before responding to the summary

judgment motion. They also have a need because it is true that this case with regard to the trade
secrets claim rests largely on disputed facts rather than matters oflaw as Defendants suggest. Thus,

this Court should deny Plaintiffs motion to protect and approve Plaintiffs motion to continue
I

summary judgment responses until after depositions have been held.
DATED this 9 th day of October, 2013.

DENNIS M. CHARNEY

Attorney for the Plaintiffs

3

PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19437, 36-37 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26,

1995).
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of October, 2013, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
David Risley
RISLEY LAW OFFICE> PLLC
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( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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( ) Overnight Mail

1443 Idaho Street
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
WALCO, INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
V.

COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political subdivision
of the State ofldaho, and

SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
·)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 42360

DECLARATION OF DENNIS M.
CHARNEY

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, Dennis M. Chainey, hereby declares;
1.

I am adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness and make

this declaration on personal knowledge.

2.

I make this affidavit based on my personal knowledge.

3.

I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs in this matter.

4,

My client recorded the meeting held on October 1st\ 161\ and 23 rd 2012, Those

recordings were provided to both of the Defendants.

DECLARATION OF DENNIS M. CHARNEY- l

Received Time Oct. 9. 2013

4:50PM No. 2573

.',1.

Oct. 9. 2013

6.

6:06PM

La

No. 14 83

f I Ce

P. 2/ 4

I sent both attorneys a letter in July requesting that they confer so that we could

choose a deposition date. See Exhibit A.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and con-ect.

DATED this 9th day of October, 2013.

DENNIS M. CHARNEY

DECLARATION OF DENNIS M. CHARNEY- 2

Received Time Oct. 9. 2013

4:50PM ffo. 2573

Oct. 9. 2013 6:07PM

La

f i Ce

No. 1483

P. 3/4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of October, 2013, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

David Risley
RISLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC

( ) U,S, Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered

P.O. Box 1247
1443 Idaho Street

( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile (208) 743-5307

Lewiston, ID 83501
208-743-5338

Bentley G. Stromberg

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, PA
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-6538

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile (208) 746-0753

LINDA HIGGINS

DECLARATION OF DENNIS M, CHARNEY" 3

Received Time Oct. 9. 2013 4:50PM No. 2573

(}

Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

WALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff,
AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES M. ROCKVVELL

vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;

and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,

Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9~ 1406, JAMES M. ROCKWELL hereby declares:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.
AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES M. ROCK\X/ELL

-1-

2.

I am no\v, and have been since January 12, 2009, a duly-elected member of

the Idaho County Board of Commissioners. I have served as Chairman since January 15,
2013.

3.

In this declaration, unless the context requires othenvise, "Wako" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
"RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and "proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the

RFP.
4.

On September 11, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners' meeting at

which I voted to approve the RFP for publication, with responses to be due by 5:00 p.m.
on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no person lodged an objection to responses to the
RFP being opened in public on October 15, 2012 and discussed at the public

Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
5.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners'

meeting at which Commissioner Brandt opened two envelopes containing the proposals.
He first opened Simmons' envelope and announced the proposed base rate appearing
inside. He then unsealed and opened Walco's envelope and announced the proposed base
rate appearing inside. All three Commissioners, plus Kathy Ackerman, Patrick Holman,
and Marietta Holman attended the meeting. No party present at the meeting objected to
the proposals being opened and the proposed base rates being announced in public, and
no party present requested that any portion of either proposal be considered a trade secret.
AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES M. ROCKWELL

-2-

6.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of

either proposal or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.
Among other things, I did not ask to see or see either proposal, did not give either
proposal to any other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either
proposal to any other person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any
other person. The first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

DATE

JAMES M. ROCKWELL
\

AMENDED DECLARATrON OF
JA.1\-1ES M. ROCKWELL

-3-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 31, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of Lhe foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
Email: dennischarney@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Walco, Inc.
David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Email: david@risleylawoffice.com
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

_x_
_x_

E-MAIL (to above email addresses)
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX) to (208) 881-0625 and (208) 743-5307

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES M. ROCKWELL

-4-

Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180

Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff,

AMENDED DECLARATION OF

vs.

JAMES A. CHMELIK

COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, JAMES A. CHMELIK hereby declares:
I.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personai knowledge.
AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES A. CHMELIK

-1-

2.

I am now, and have been since January 11, 2011, a duly-elected member of

the Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
3.

In this declaration, unless the context requires otherwise, "Wako" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons". means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
"RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and "proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the
RFP.
4.

On September 11, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners' meeting at

which I voted to approve the RFP for publication, with resppnses to be due by 5:00 p.m.
on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no person lodged an objection to responses to the
RFP being opened in public on October 15, 2012 and discussed at the public

Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
5.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners'

meeting at which Commissioner Brandt opened two envelopes containing the proposals.
He first opened Simmons' envelope and announced the proposed base rate appearing
inside. He then unsealed and opened W alco 's envelope and announced the proposed base
rate appearing inside. All three Commissioners, plus Kathy Ackerman, Patrick Holman,

and Marietta Holman attended the meeting. No party present at the meeting objected to
the proposals being opened and the proposed base rates being announced in public, and
no party present requested that any portion of either proposal be considered a trade secret.

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES A. CHMELIK

-2-

6.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of

either proposal or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.
Among other things, I did not ask to see or see either proposal, did not give either
proposal to any other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either
proposal to any other person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any
other person. The first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

oJ
DATE

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES A. CHMELIK

~ A ,Ci
~ ~11,·;J

C' .

GAMES

A CHMELIK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 31, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
Email: dennischarney@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Walco, Inc.

David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Email: david@risleylawoffice.com
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

_K..

E-MAIL (to above email addresses)
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX) to (208) 881-0625 and (208) 743-5307

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES A. CHMELIK

-4-

Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
BROWN & McNICHOLS" P.A.
321 13th Street
Lev,dston,Jdaho 83501
(208) 743-'6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
No. 3737
ISBNo. 9180
Attorneys for Defendant Idah.o County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT.OF THESECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF T1fE STATE OF IDAIIOtIN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

WALCOf INC., an Idaho corporation;

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff:

MAENDED DECLARATION OF
R SKIPPER BRANDT
COUN1YOFIDAHO, apolitical
subdivision· of the State of Idaho;
and

SI1\.flvfONS SANITATION SERVICE~
INC., anidaho corporation,
Defendants.
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, R SK1PPER BRANDT hereby declares:
l.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

this declaration on personal knowledge.
A.IVIBNDED DECLARATION OF
R. SK1PPER BRANDT

-1-

/ i

I am now, and have been since March 19, 2007, a duly-appointed or -

elected member of the Idaho County Board of Commissioners. I s(irved as Chairman
from January 12, 2009 to January 15, 2013,

In this declatation,·.unless the context requires otherwis1e, "Wako" means

3.

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons'7 means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County

i

Board of Commissioners on S~teniber 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract;.and ''proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the
I

4.

On September · 11, 2012, I attended and! presided over the public

Commissioners' meeting at which I voted to approve

.

.

thf RFP for

publication, with

I

responses to be due by 5:00 p.m~ on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no person lodged
an objection to responses to the RFP being opened in pub:lic on October 15, 2012 and
'

discussed at the public Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
5.

At 3:00 p,m. on October 15, 2012, I attended! and presided over the public

Commissioners' meeting at which I personally opened two envelopes containing the
proposals. I first opened Simmons' envelope and announced the proposed base rate
appearing inside. I then unsealed; and opened Walco's envelope and announced the
proposed base rate appearing inside. All three Com:r.aissi~ners, plus Kathy Ackerman,
1->,;:it,4 r-1t-

Holman, and Marietta Holman attended the meetfog. No party present at the

meeting objected to the proposals being opened and the proposed base rates being

A.MENDED DECLARATION OF
R. SKJ.PPERBRANDT

-2-

in public, and no party present requested that any portion of either proposal be

considered a trade secret.
6.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to lea:m the contents of

either proposal· or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.

Among other things, I did not ask to see or see either proposal, did not give either
proposal to any other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either
proposal to any other person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal \vith any
other person. The first timel saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.
l declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

I

-](-(]>

DATE

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
R SKIPPERBRANDT

-3-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 31, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
Email: dennischarney@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Walco, Inc.
David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Email: david@risleylawoffice.com
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

_x_
_.K_

E-MAIL (to above email addresses)
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX) to (208) 881-0625 and (208) 743-5307

II

Joi[~~~~A---

.AJvIENDED DECLARATION OF
R. SKIPPER BRANDT

-4-

-- --·-----------i

Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)

ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180

Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

Case No. CV-2013-42360

WALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED DECLARATION OF ·
KATHY M. ACKERMAN

vs.
CO{JNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, KATHY M. ACKERMAN hereby declares:

1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.
AMENDED DECLARA..TION OF
KATHY M. ACKERMAN

-1-

2.

I run now, and have been ,since January 11, 2011, employed as the Clerk of

the District Court ex officio Auditor/Recorder for Idaho County and Clerk for the Board
of Idaho County Commissioners.

3.

The documents attached hereto as Exhibits A through DD are true and

correct copies of records of regularly conducted business activity of Idaho County and its
employees which were made or received at or near the time of the events referenced,
described or depicted in those Exhibits, and which were made or received and kept in the
course of the regularly conducted business activity ofldaho County.
4.

In this declaration, unless the context requires otherwise, "Walco" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
·'RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and «proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the

RFP.
5.

On September 11, 2012, I attended and took the minutes of the public

Commissioners' meeting, at which the Commissioners voted to approve the RFP
publication, with responses due by 5:00 p.m. on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no
person lodged an objection to responses to the RFP being opened in public on October
15, 2012 and discussed at the public Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
6.

On October 12, 2012, just after 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon, I ,vitnessed

Robert Simmons of Simmons hand deliver an unsealed envelope to Debra Todd, an
employee in my office who sits in· my immediate vicinity. I watched Debra immediately
.Ai.\1.ENDED DECLARATION OF

KATHY M. ACKERMAN

-2-

envelope with the date and time of day and hand the envelope to me. Later that
same day, shortly before 5:00 p.m. in the afternoon, I witnessed Marietta Holman of
Walco hand deliver a sealed envelope to Ms. Todd. I watched Debra immediately stamp
the envelope with the date and time of day and hand the envelope to me. Neither Mr.

Simmons nor Ms. Holman stated or otherwise indicated to Ms. Todd or me that his or her
envelope contained a trade secret or proprietary information.
7.

Immediately after each envelope's delivery, I personally placed each

envelope in my desk drawer in a file I had created for responses to the RFP. To the best
of my knowledge, no person touched, viewed, or removed the envelopes from my desk
drawer until I personally removed them just before 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, to

carry them to the public Idaho County Commissioners' meeting at which they were first
opened.
8.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners'

meeting and \vitnessed Commissioner Skip Brandt open the two envelopes I gave to him
that contained the proposals.

All three Commissioners, plus Patrick Holman, and

Marietta Holman attended the meeting. No party present at the meeting objected to the
proposals being opened and the proposed base rates being announced in public, and no
party present requested that any portion of either proposal be considered a trade secret.
9.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of

either proposal or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.
Among other things, I did not look at either proposal, did not give either proposal to any
other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either proposal to any other
A.JvIBNDED DECLARATlON OF
KA THY M. ACKERMAN
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person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any other person. The
first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.
10.

Exhibit A is a copy of Simmons' contract with Idaho County effective

January 1, 2003, recorded in Idaho County as document number 425769.

11.

Exhibit B is a copy of Walco's contract with Idaho County effective

January 1, 2003, recorded in Idaho County as document number 425770.
12.

Exhibit C is the first recorded copy of Walco's contract with Idaho County

effective October 1, 2006, recorded in Idaho County as document number 461073.
13.

Exhibit D is the second recorded copy of Walco's contract with Idaho

Count:y effective October 1, 2006, recorded in Idaho County as document number
461972.

14.

Exhibit E is a copy of Simmons' renewal contract with Idaho County

effective January 1, 2013, recorded in Idaho County as document number 485052.
15.

Exhibit F is a copy of a letter dated June 7, 2012, from Walco's attorney,

Dennis Charney.
16.

Exhibit G is a copy of a letter dated August 7, 2012, sent to Walco's

attorney, Dennis Charney.
17.

Exhibit H is a copy of an email chain showing emails exchanged with

Walco's attorney, Dennis Charney, between August 8, 2012 and August 14, 2012.
18.

Exhibit I is a copy of the minutes of the September 11, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
19.

Exhibit J is a copy of the RFP.

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
K/tTHY M. ACKERMAN

20.

Exhibit K is a copy of two envelopes delivered to and time-stamped by my

office on October 12, 2012.

When later unsealed, I observed that each envelope

contained the proposal of the entity named on the outside of the envelope.
21.

Exhibit L is a copy of Simmons' proposal.

22.

Exhibit Mis a copy ofWalco's proposal.

23.

Exhibit N is a copy of the minutes of the October 16, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
24.

Exhibit O is a copy of a letter dated October 22, 2012, received from

Walco's attorney, Dennis Charney.

25.

Exhibit P is a copy of Walco's invoice for fuel surcharges for the period

from July 1, 2012 through September 30, 2012.
26.

Exhibit Q is a copy of the minutes of the October 23, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
27.

Exhibit Risa copy of the minutes of the October 30, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.

28.

Exhibit Sis a copy of the minutes of the November 6, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
29.

Exhibit Tis a copy of the minutes of the November 27, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
30.

Exhibit U is a copy of the minutes of the November 30, 2012 meeting of

the Idaho County Board of Commissioners.

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
KATHY M. ACKERMAN
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31.

Exhibit V is a copy of Simmons' contract with Idaho County (resulting

from its proposal) effective January l, 2013, recorded in Idaho County as document
numbers 486636 and 486674.
32.

Exhibit W is a true and correct copy of the invoices submitted by Simmons

for services provided from January 1, 2013 through .March 31, 2013 pursuant to the solid
waste services contract resulting from its proposal. Exclusive of $3,708.50 of charges
payable for tires and appliances, I caused Idaho County to approve and pay Simmons
$240,561.70 for base rate and fuel surcharges for this period, consisting of three monthly
service payments of $77,202, plus one payment for fuel surcharges of$8,955.70.
33.

Exhibit Xis a true and correct copy of the invoices submitted by Simmons

for services provided from April 1, 2013 through June 30, 2013 pursuant to the solid
waste services contract resulting-from its proposal. Exclusive of $3;548. 70 of charges
payable for tires .and appliances, I caused Idaho County to approve and pay Simmons
$242,462.70 for base rate and fuel surcharges for the noted period; consisting of three

monthly service payments of $77,202, plus one payment for fuel surcharges of
$10,856.70.

34.

Exhibit Y is a copy of Walco's Notice of Tort Claim filed on or about

January 7, 2013.
35.

Exhibit Z is a copy of a letter dated February 19, 2013, sent to Walco's

attorney, Dennis Charney.
36.

Exhibit AA is a copy of Idaho County Ordinance No. 12.

AiviENDED DECLARATION OF
KATHY M. ACKERMAN
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37.

Exhibit BB is a copy of Idaho County Ordinance No. 54, recorded in Idaho

Cou..nty as document number 450565.
38.

Exhibit CC is a copy ofldaho County Ordinance No. 55, recorded in Idaho

County as document number 457276.
39.

Exhibit DD is a copy ofldaho County Ordinance No. 58, recorded in Idaho

County as document number 469773.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct

/0-3()3
DATE

AMENDED DECLARATION OF

KA THY M. ACKERMAN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 31, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
Email: dennischarney@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Walco, Inc.

David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Email: david@risleylawoffice.com
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.
_K_

_K_

E-MAIL (to above email addresses)
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX) to (208) 881-0625 and (208) 743-5307

aD.McKarcher

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
KATHY M. ACKERMAN
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Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff,
vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTlON FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1-

I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Walco, Inc. ("Wako"), was one of two responders to Idaho County's

request for proposals ("RFP") for a solid waste collection contract. Walco claims that
the RFP was actually a request for competitive bids not proposals, that its "bid" was
lowest, and that Idaho County wrongfully disclosed Walco' s proposal to the other
responder, defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. ("Simmons"). Walco thus claims
Idaho County tortiously interfered with its prospective economic expectancy and
misappropriated trade secrets. Idaho County has moved for summary judgment on all
claims.
II.

RELEVANTFACTS
Idaho law permits counties to contract for solid waste collection services directly

with a vendor of the county's choice, with or without using competitive bidding. See
Idaho Code § 31-4403(6); Compl. <j{ 10. Pursuant to this authority, Idaho County for
several decades has contracted for solid waste disposal services exclusively with Walco
and Simmons, each covering different portions of the County.

In 2002, each firm

executed a separate ten-year contract to provide these services from January 1, 2003
through December 31, 2012. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. A, B.) Walco and Idaho County
in 2008 revised their contract retroactive to October 1, 2006 to provide Walco, among
other things, fuel surcharges and an automatic yearly base rate increase based on the
Consumer Price Index.

(See Ackerman Deel. Exs. C and D (two identical recorded

contracts).)

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -2-

On July 31, 2012, Idaho County and Simmons executed a ten-year renewal
contract effective January 1, 2013 for Simmons' coverage area. (See Ackerman Deel.
Ex. E.) Idaho County and Walco, however, could not agree on certain terms of a ten-year
renewal contract for Walco's coverage area. (See Compl. <j[<j[ 7-8.) Walco thus suggested
that Idaho County put the contract out to bid. (Compl. <j[ 9; see Ackerman Deel. Ex. F.)
On August 7, 2012, in a final attempt to conclude a contract with Walco, Idaho County
sent Walco a copy of the recently executed Simmons-area agreement, indicating that
Idaho County would be willing to enter a similar contract with W alco for its coverage
area. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. G.) Walco rejected the proposed contract and again
suggested the contract be put out to bid. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. H.)
On September 11, 2012, Idaho County approved publication of a request for
proposals (not a request for bids) with a response deadline of October 12, 2012. (See
Compl. <]{ 11 & Ex. A; Ackerman Deel. Exs. I, J.)1 The RFP consisted of (a) two pages of
general proposal information, (b) 16 pages of a proposed contract with two exhibits, and
(c) two pages of evaluation criteria. (See generally Ackerman Deel. Ex. J.)2 At this

1

Exhibit A to Walco' s Complaint is incomplete. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36
should follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.
2

The County's proposed contract contained, among others, three material terms of
relevance here. First, the County wanted to retain the right to implement a "recycling
surcharge" by which the contractor might in the future rebate the County (on a per-ton
basis) for any reduction in collected waste resulting from the removal of recyclable
materials from the solid waste stream. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. J, at §§ 11.2, 11.3.)
Second, the County intended to continue to allow for annual base rate increases based on
changes to the Consumer Price Index. (See id. at§ 7.1.) Third, the County was willing
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meeting, the Commissioners announced publicly that the proposals would be reviewed on
October 15 and discussed at their meeting on October 16. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. I.)
No party objected to the intended public review and discussion of the proposals.
(Ackerman Decl.15; Brandt Decl.14; Chmelik Decl.14; Rockwell Decl.14.)
On the October 12, 2012 response deadline, the office of Idaho County Recorder,
Kathy Ackerman, received and time stamped two envelopes containing responsive
proposals. (Ackerman Decl.16.) Simmons hand delivered its unsealed proposal at 3:0_4
p.m., and Walco hand delivered its sealed proposal at 4:53 p.m. (Id. & Ex. K.) Both
proposals remained in the Recorder's office, and Walco's proposal remained sealed, until
Walco's proposal was unsealed and Simmons' proposal was opened on October 15, 2012
in a public meeting attended by all three County Commissioners, Ackerman, and
representatives of Walco. (Ackerman Am. Deel. c_[<J{ 7-8.)
At no time during the October 15 meeting did Walco or any other party object to
the proposals being opened in public and the base price in each proposal being
announced. (Ackerman Am. Deel. 18; Brandt Am. Deel. 15; Chmelik Am. Deel. 15;
Rockwell Am. Deel.

<J[

5.) Walco recorded the 20-minute October 15, 2012 meeting at

which the proposals were opened and publicly discussed. (See Deel. of Counsel Ex. A
(audio recording of October 15, 2012 Commissioner meeting).) The recording reflects
that, after calling the meeting to order, Commissioner Brandt unsealed the proposals in

to continue paying the fuel surcharge agreed to in 2008, provided that the County would,
in tum, continue to receive a fuel credit for decreases to fuel prices. (See id. at§ 7.2.)
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the order they were submitted, announced the base price of each, and asked the clerk to
copy

proposals for the Commissioners. (Id. at time stamp 1: 15.) Several minutes of

small talk ensued until the clerk returned with photocopies of the proposals. (Id. at time
stamp 5:18 (Commissioner Brandt referring to copies "hot off the press").)

The

Commissioners reviewed the proposals silently for several more minutes until
Commissioner Rockwell began asking questions about the proposals' terms. (Id. at time
stamp 9: 12 (Commissioner Rockwell and Walco representative discussing similarities
and differences between Walco's existing contract and its newly proposed contract).)
The remainder of the meeting was a discussion of key terms of both parties' proposals, all
without any party objecting to the discussion occurring in a public meeting.

(See

generally id.) At no point did any Walco representative refuse to answer questions or

request that the Commissioners stop discussing the proposals. (See generally id.)
The base prices proposedwere $77,202 for Simmons and $87,000 for Walco. (See
Ackerman Deel. Exs. L, M.) Simmons' proposal was one page long. (See Compl. 'JI 20
& Ex. C; Ackerman Deel. Ex. L. )3 Walco' s proposal was more elaborate -

but also

proposed an entirely different contract than the one proposed by the County with its RFP.

3

Simmons proposed a base rate and only one material deviation from the pricing terms
proposed by the Commissioners: an additional per-ton charge for waste exceeding 4,500
tons per year. (See Compl. Ex. C; Ackerman Deel. Ex. L.) Simmons also proposed to
use its own transfer stations, which were not and are not located in Idaho County, where
Walco's transfer stations are located. (See id.)
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(See Compl.

<J[

18; Ackerman Deel. Ex. M.)4

On Octobet 16, 2012, at a regularly

scheduled public meeting of the County Commissioners, both Simmons and Walco
discussed their proposals at length and in detail, including discussing material terms of
Walco's proposal. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. N.)
Walco tried to persuade the Commissioners to choose its proposal over Simmons'
proposal. 5

At the October 23, 2012 Commissioners' meeting, a lengthy discussion

ensued about the two proposals, after which the Commissioners voted to enter
negotiations with Simmons. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. Q.)6 On November 30, 2012, the

4

Walco opted to propose a flat 5% per year "cost of living" increase to its base rate in
lieu of fuel surcharges or increases based upon the Consumer Price Index. (See Compl.
Ex. B-15, at § 7 .1.) W alco thus did not allow for decreases in fuel costs and wanted a 5 %
cost-of-living increase even if the relevant Consumer Price Index had changed less than
5%. Most notably, Walco's agreement did not allow for even the possibility of a future
recycling surcharge. ( Compare CompI. Ex. B-17, at § 11.1, with Ackerman Deel. Ex. M,
at§§ 11.2, 11.3.) Walco thus rejected all three of the County's material proposed terms·
described .above in footnote 2.
5

For example, in an October 22, 2012 letter to Idaho County, Walco's attorney asserted
that Idaho County would pay Simmons more than it would pay Walco, in part because
Simmons' monthly fuel surcharge would be "at least $7,900," which he noted would total
$85,102 when added to Simmons' proposed monthly base rate of $77,202. (See
Ackerman Deel. Ex. 0, at 3.) This stood in contrast to Walco's own recent fuel
surcharges for the same coverage area, which had totaled only $11,556 for the entire
quarter ending September 30, 2012, an average of only $3,852 per month. (See
Ackerman Deel. Ex. P.)
6

Negotiations were conducted in public (except for contract drafting between the parties'
lawyers). At the October 30, 2012 Commissioners' meeting, Simmons, among other
things, agreed to increase its annual tonnage cap from 4,500 tons to 4,632 tons before
triggering a per-ton charge. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. R.) The contract was discussed at
the November 6 and 27 meetings, and at the latter of these two, the public was invited to
(and did) comment on the proposed agreement with Simmons and was advised that
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Commissioners approved and executed the contract with Simmons, to take effect on
January 1, 2013. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. U, V.) 7
On January 7, 2013, Walco filed a Notice of Tort Claim, making the same
allegations presented by its Complaint. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. Y.) On February 19,

2013, Idaho County denied the tort claim and explained its reasoning. (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. Z.) Walco filed its Complaint on March 25, 2013. (Compl., at 1.)

III.

ARGUMENT
Walco claims that Idaho County tortiously interfered with an economic

expectancy and misappropriated trade secrets.

Idaho County is entitled to summary

judgment on both claims.

A.

Tortious Interference with an Economic Expectancy

Tortious interference with a prospective economic expectancy has five elements:
(1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference
inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful

copies of the proposed contract were available for review. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. S,
T.)
7

For the first six months of 2013, Idaho County paid Simmons a total of $483,024.40 in
base rate and fuel surcharges under the contract at dispute here. (See Ackerman Deel.
1132-33 & Exs. W, X.) At Walco's base rate of $87,000 per month (with no fuel
surcharges), the Simmons contract has cost $38,975.60 less than the Walco contract
would have cost for the same period. (Both contracts provided for separate payment for
tires, appliances, and tipping fees, so those charges, totaling $7,257.20, are not included
in this comparison.) In particular, Simmons' fuel surcharges for the first half of 2013
totaled only $19,812.40 (see id.) - an average of only $3,302.07 per month and nearly
$4,600 per month less than the $7,900 per month Walco "estimated" that Simmons would
charge. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. 0, at 3 (letter from Walco's attorney).)
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by some measure beyond the fact of the interference· itself, and (5) resulting
damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.

Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893, 243 P.3d 1069, 1081 (2010)
(quoting Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (2008)).
Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment on several independent bases: first,
Idaho County is not a third party to any alleged expectancy; second, Walco cannot
establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy; third, Idaho County did not act
wrongfully; and, fourth, because no expectancy existed after Idaho County's RFP was
published, Idaho County had no knowledge of the existence of any expectancy, did not
interfere with any alleged expectancy, and did not cause Walco to suffer any damages for
the loss of any expectancy.
1.

Idaho County is not a third party to Walco' s alleged economic
expectancy.

A tortious interference claim may rest against a third party to the expectancy, but
not the other party to the expectancy:
Deliberately and at his pleasure, one may ordinarily refuse to deal with
another, and the conduct is not regarded as improper, subjecting the actor to
liability. . . . There is no general duty to do business with all who offer
their services, wares or patronage; but there is a general duty not to
interfere intentionally with another's reasonable business expectancies of
trade with third persons, whether or not they are secured by contract, unless
the interference is not improper under the circumstances.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. b (1979) (emphases added), cited in id.

§ 766B, cmt. b; see also id. § 766B; Joel E. Smith, Liability of Third Party for

Inteiference with Prospective Contractual Relationship Between Two Other Parties, 6
A.L.R. 4th 195, §§ l[a], 2.
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Walco's alleged economic expectancy was a contract with Idaho County. As a
matter

law, Idaho County cannot have tortiously interfered with an expectancy of its

own making. Walco cannot state a claim for tortious interference against Idaho County,
because it is not a third party to the expectancy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 766, cmt. b (1979), cited in id. § 766B, cmt. b.

2.

Walco cannot establish the existence of a valid economic
expectancy.

Walco cannot establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy under Idaho
law because Idaho County was not required to and did not seek competitive bids.
Instead, Idaho County proceeded by requesting proposals, and an RFP does not create a
valid economic expectancy in any responder.
In Idaho, the low bidder in a true competitive bidding process may be able to
establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy, because such a low bidder has a
legally enforceable property interest in being awarded the contract bid upon. See Dana,

Larson, Roubal & Assocs. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Canyon County, 124 Idaho 794, 798, 864
P.2d 632, 636 (Ct. App. 1993). Unlike competitive bidders, however, responders to an
RFP have "no legitimate claim to the benefit of being awarded a contract," i.e., they have
no valid economic expectancy. See id. at 802, 864 P.2d at 640. "At the most, they ha[ve]
a unilateral expectation," and are "potential bidders only," not actual bidders. Id. at 800,

864 P.2d at 638.

As Dana summarizes, id. at 798-802, 864 P.2d at 636--40, when a county is
required to seek competitive bids or inadvertently does so, that county is bound by the
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mandatory competitive bidding statute.

See Idaho Code §§ 67-2802 and -2806(2).

When, however, a county is neither required to seek competitive bids nor inadvertently
does so, that entity may proceed by any other lawful procedure it chooses. See Idaho
Code § 67-2802 ("No provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to preclude the use of
procurement procedures otherwise authorized by law."); Dana, 124 Idaho at 802, 864
P.2d at 640 ("This was not a request for competitive bids, therefore the competitive
bidding statutes did not define the method of operation."). One such lawful procedure is
issuing an RFP. Dana, 124 Idaho at 801-02, 864 P.2d at 639-40.
Thus, a responder to a county's RFP could potentially establish the existence of a
valid economic expectancy only if the county was required to or inadvertently did solicit
competitive bids instead of proposals. Whether an RFP requests proposals or competitive
bids is a question of law: in Dana, the trial court granted, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, summary judgment by interpreting the RFP at issue. Id. at 799-800, 864 P.2d
at 637-38 (analyzing the RFP and concluding, "The RFP here simply was not phrased as
an invitation for competitive bids."). In this case, Idaho County was not required to and
did not seek competitive bids.
First, it was not required to because Idaho Code § 31-4403(6) exempts contracts
for solid waste "services" from competitive bidding requirements. 8 Walco benefitted

8

Walco claims that Idaho County was contracting for an entire solid waste "system,"
which is subject to competitive bidding just like public "buildings." (See Compl. 113
(discussing a "system's" treatment as a public "building" under Idaho Code§ 31-4402).)
Idaho County's contract has been for several decades, and still is, for solid waste
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I

exemption for several decades and negotiated in reliance on it for much of
2012. (Compl. q[<J[ 6-7, 10.)
Second, Idaho County did not inadvertently seek competitive bids.

Idaho

County's RFP contained no form of the word "bid." (See Compl. Ex. A; Ackerman Deel.
Ex. J.)9 The RFP requested "proposals" and promised only that the County would choose
one "proposer" with whom to "begin contract negotiations." (Id.) It nowhere stated that
the lowest "bidder" would be awarded a contract. (/d.) Only one of its many evaluation
criteria was cost-related, and even that criterion indicated that cost was relevant in
relation to how dramatically a proposer modified the County's proposed contract. (Id.)
Dana is directly on point. In Dana, Canyon County, after reviewing all of the
proposals received in response to its RFP, opted to contract directly with one proposer for
his personal consulting services, contracts for which, like solid waste contracts, are
exempt from Idaho's competitive bidding statutes. See Dana, 124 Idaho at 796-97, 801,
864 P.2d at 634--35, 639. Because the statute did not require competitive bidding and the
County had done nothing more or less than it offered to do in its RFP -

e.g., it reserved

"services," i.e., waste collection, not the construction of an entire solid waste "system"
akin to construction of a public "building." Competitive bidding has not been and was
not required.
9

Walco has attached to its Complaint, and thus admitted the existence and contents of,
the RFP at issue here. (Comp!. <JI ll & Ex. A.) Walco's Exhibit A is incomplete,
however. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36 should follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part
of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.
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the right to reject any or all bids, see id. at 800, 864·P.2d at 638 -

the Court held the

had not violated the statute or departed from its RFP:
The RFP said nothing more than that if a suitable proposal was submitted, it
would merit further negotiations. The RFP did not provide that the lowest
cost proposal, or the most elaborate, would win the contract. Other criteria
were considered. The respondents exercised their discretion and chose the
individual and proposal they thought best suited the County's needs.

Id. at 802, 864 P.2d at 640. Because Idaho County's RFP invited proposals and not
competitive bids, the RFP, just as in Dana, "was not a request for competitive bids, [and]
therefore the competitive bidding statutes did not define the method of operation." Id.
Walco thus had "[a]t the most, ... a unilateral expectation." Id. at 800, 864 P.2d at 638. 10
For these reasons, Walco cannot establish the first element of its claim because it
cannot establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy.
3.

Idaho County did not act wrongfully or violate County Ordinances
12 and 55.

To establish the fourth element of its claim, Walco asserts that Idaho County acted
wrongfully beyond the fact of interference itself by violating County Ordinances 12 and
55, relating to the 10-year contract term and the location of dumpster sites in Idaho

10

In addition, even if Idaho County's RFP had sought competitive bids, Walco's
proposed contract rejected key terms of the County's proposed contract and stated a
higher base rate with automatic 5% annual increases. Walco's own past fuel surcharges
made its self-serving estimate of Simmons' $7,900-per-month fuel surcharge incredible.
See supra note 5. Walco could not possibly have had a valid economic expectancy,
because it did not propose the lowest price. No matter how many times Walco asserts its
counterfactual position, i.e., that "Simmons' bid was, on its face, the more expensive bid"
(see Compl. CJI1[ 21, 27, 39, 45, 47, 48), nothing changes the facts shown by the documents
themselves. See also supra note 7 (noting Simmons' costs for first six months of 2013).
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County. (See Compl.

<Jl:<J[

19, 28-29, 49-51.) Idalio County violated neither of these

Ordinances, neither of which is still in effect.
a.

Ordinance 12 and its 5-year contract limitation has been
repealed.

Walco alleges that Idaho County violated County Ordinance 12 by proposing and
executing a 10-year contract with Simmons. (Compl. <j[<j[ 28-29, 49-50.) Ordinance 12,
enacted in 1976, was the County's original solid waste ordinance, and it limited solid
waste contracts to five years' duration. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. AA (Idaho County
Ordinance No. 12) (repealed), at art. V, sec. 18(A) ("No such contract shall exceed five
(5) years' duration.").) Idaho County has wholly reenacted, with revisions, its solid
waste ordinance several times since 1976. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. BB-DD (Idaho
County Ordinance Nos. 54 (repealed), 55 (repealed), 58).) Even a brief comparison of
each ordinance confirms that each wholesale reenactment substituted for, superseded, and
repealed prior solid waste ordinances. 11 Ordinance 54 expressly repealed Ordinance 12
(among others), and it did not contain any time limitation on contracts. (See Ackerman

11

See Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497,503 (1936) ("There are two wellsettled categories of repeals by implication: (1) Where provisions in the two acts are in
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier
act."); see also, e.g., State v. Davidson, 78 Idaho 553, 558-59, 309 P.2d 211, 215 (1957)
("The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways is a comprehensive statute,
legislatively intended to cover the whole field and subject matter of the operation of
motor vehicles, including definitions of the several offenses growing out of the improper
operation of such vehicles, prescribing penalties for those offenses, and repealing by
implication all acts and parts of acts inconsistent therewith.").
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Deel. Ex. BB, at 1 & art. IV, sec. 18(A).) And Ordinance 58, the currently effective
ordinance, does not contain any time limitation on solid waste contracts. (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. DD, at art. IV, sec. 18(A).) There is no five-year limitation on solid waste
service contracts in Idaho County.

In addition, three facts lay bare Walco's allegation on this point: (1) Simmons' and
Walco's 2003-2012 contracts with Idaho County were IO-year contracts (see Ackerman
Deel. Exs. A, B); (2) Walco did not complain when Idaho County's RFP was published
with a proposed IO-year contract (see Ackerman Deel. Ex. J, at § 2); and (3) Walco's
own proposal was for a IO-year contract (see Compl. Ex. B-11, at§ 2). Idaho County did
not act wrongfully in executing a 10-year contract with Simmons.
b.

Ordinance 55 does not require transfer stations in Idaho
County.

Walco alleges that Idaho County violated Ordinance 55 because Simmons did not
promise to have a "transfer station" in Idaho County, as allegedly "required by Idaho
County Ordinance 55, Section 11, B.1." (Compl. <][q[ 19, 49, 51.) w·alco cites Ordinance
55, which is one of the subsequent reenactments of Ordinance 12 discussed above. But
neither is the current one; Ordinance 58 is the only currently effective solid waste
ordinance. And, regardless, Ordinance 55 never required (and Ordinance 58 does not
require) anyone to maintain a transfer station in Idaho County.
Section l 0 of each ordinance addresses "transfer stations" and nowhere requires
they be operated in any particular location. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. DD (Idaho County
Ordinance No. 58), at § 10; see also Ackerman Deel. Ex. CC (Idaho County Ordinance
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No. 55) (repealed), at§ 10.) Section 11, cited by Walco, addresses County residents (not

the County or its contractors) and requires them to dispose of trash at "designated
disposal sites or ... available transfer stations throughout the County." (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. DD (Idaho County Ordinance No. 58), at § 11 (emphasis added); see also
Ackerman Deel. Ex. CC (Idaho County Ordinance No. 55) (repealed), at § 11.)
Residents may use one of Idaho County's several "designated disposal sites" without
violating the ordinance. Even if Simmons operated transfer stations several counties
away (or none at all), there would still be no violation of Sections 10 or 11 of Ordinance
58 (or repealed Ordinance 55), because neither requires Idaho County, Simmons, Walco,
or anyone else to maintain a transfer station in Idaho County.
4.

Walco cannot establish the remaining elements of its interference
claim.

Walco cannot establish the second, third, or fifth elements of its tortious
interference claim. No valid economic expectancy existed after Idaho County published
its RFP. See Dana, 124 Idaho at 800, 802, 864 P.2d at 638, 640. Therefore, Idaho
County cannot have had knowledge of the existence of any expectancy, cannot have
interfered with any expect~ncy, and cannot have caused Walco to suffer any damages for
the loss of any expectancy.
For all of the above reasons, Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment on
W alco' s tortious interference claim.
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Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
Idaho Trade Secrets Act provides for damages for misappropriation of a trade
secret. See Idaho Code§ 48-801 to -807. In Idaho, a "trade secret" is
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use;
and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Idaho Code§ 48-801(5). 12
The plaintiff in a misappropriation suit has the burden to establish first that a trade
secret "actually existed." Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 897,
243 P.3d 1069, 1085 (2010); Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734, 992 P.2d

12

Because Idaho has adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and codified the meaning of
"trade secret," the common law factors listed in the Restatement of Torts are now
"helpful guidelines" that "can be used" to assist a court's analysis, but they are "no longer
required to find a trade secret." Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 735, 992 P.2d
175, 184 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those six factors are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside [the plaintiff's]
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard
the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and
his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in
developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by oti11ers.

Id. (quoting Restatement of Torts§ 757, cmt. b (1939)). "All of these factors address the
issue of whether the information in question is generally known or readily ascertainable."
Id.
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1

183

999) ("Without a proven trade secret there can be no misappropriation, even if

defendants' action was wrongful." (internal quotation marks omitted)). A plaintiff in
a misappropriation suit must also "specify the precise information that it claim[ s] to be
protected trade secrets." Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v KMG Am. Corp., Case No. A05-2079,
2006 WL 2529760, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2006); see also Electro-Craft Corp. v.

Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983) (discussing specificity of
plaintiff's claims), cited with approval in Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 734, 992 P.2d at 183.
A plaintiff must "describe the subject matter of the trade secret with sufficient

particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special
knowledge of those persons skilled in the trade." /max Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152
F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
In sum, as to the first statutory element, see § 48-801(5)(a), a plaintiff must
specify precisely what "information" allegedly has "independent economic value," is not
"generally known," is not "readily ascertainable by proper means" by others, see id., is
not "general knowledge in the trade," and is not "special knowledge of those persons
skilled in the trade," see /max, 152 F.3d at 1164-65.
As to the second statutory element, see § 48-801(5)(b), at least one court has held
that a plaintiff cannot be held to have taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of
information where the plaintiff submitted documents to a state agency that was subject to
a public records law without marking the documents confidential: "[T]he failure to
identify information furnished to a state agency as putatively exempt from public
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effectively destroys any confidential'character it might otherwise have enjoyed
secret." SePRO Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 839 So. 2d 781, 783

as a

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The court reasoned:
The trade secret owner who fails to label a trade secret as such, or otherwise
to specify in writing upon delivery to a state agency that information which
it contends is confidential and exempt under the public records law is not to
be disclosed, has not taken measures or made efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain the information's secrecy.

Id. at 784.
Walco's misappropriation claim fails on both statutory elements: its proposal
contained no information of independent economic value that was not generally known or
readily ascertainable, and, regardless, it did not take reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of any such information.
1.

W alco' s proposal contained no information of independent of
economic value that was not generally known or readily
ascertainable.

Nothing in Walco's proposal had "independent economic value" and was not
"generally known" or "readily ascertainable by proper means."
801 (S)(a).

Idaho Code § 48-

Walco claims that "[b]ecause Walco had been successfully servicing the

unincorporated areas of Idaho County covered by [its] contract for almost 50 years, [its]
proposal included significant trade secret information."

(Compl.

CJ[

18.)

Walco later

claims that "proprietary business operations outlined in the Walco bid proposal" were
secret. (Compl. CJ[ 53.) These assertions are belied by three independent considerations.
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First, Walco attached to its publicly filed Complaint a full, unredacted copy of the
allegedly contains trade secrets of value to competitors. (See id. &

13

This necessarily means that Walco cannot argue that its proposal has sufficient economic
value to anyone for any purpose other than in respect of this one solid waste contract.
Else, why would Walco voluntarily place in the public record the very document that
they insist contains "proprietary business operations"? (Compl.

<JI

53.) One would expect

that proprietary business operations of such economic value as to constitute trade secrets
would also be useful to Walco's competitors other than Simmons -. none of whom
W alco has ever alleged had access to its proposal before Walco attached it to its
Complaint. Walco has made its burden tougher: even if it could state a misappropriation
claim (which it cannot), it would have to show that whatever secrets were contained in
the proposal were of value only to, and not generally known or readily ascertainable by,
Simmons -

a competitor who has operated in the same region for several decades

alongside Walco. This is an extraordinary burden, which Walco cannot meet.
Second, Walco's proposal contains no descriptions of "business operations."
Other than the one page containing Walco's base rate and key contract terms, the
proposal contains highly generalized promotional statements and simple facts about its
business, its clients, its history, and past achievements that Walco believed qualified it to
serve Idaho County. (See generally Ackerman Deel. Ex. M.) Walco's proposed contract

13

Exhibit B to Walco's Complaint is over-inclusive. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36
should follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.
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is substantially the same as the publicly recorded contract it executed with Idaho County
(See

Ackerman Deel. Exs. C, D.) Walco should be able immediately to detail

for the Court the precise phrases and sentences that are or were allegedly "trade secrets."
W alco cannot claim it cannot do this or that it must be done under seal, because it has
already placed the entire proposal in the public record by attaching it to its Complaint.
Third, even Walco's one page containing its proposed base rate and contract terms
had no "independent economic value" to Simmons between the time it was submitted to
Idaho County at 4:52 p.m. on October 12, 2012 and publicly unsealed at 3:00 p.m. on
October 15. 14 This is necessarily true because (1) Simmons submitted its proposal at
3:04 p.m., nearly two hours before Walco (see Ackerman Deel. <[ 6 & Ex. K),
(2) Simmons did not alter its proposal after it submitted it and before it was opened on

October 15 (Ackerman Deel.<[<[ 7, 9), and (3) all the facts that the Commissioners needed
to choose to negotiate with Simmons were contained in Simmons' straightforward
proposal. Walco's proposal simply did not and does not have the value Walco attaches to
it.
Even if someone wrongfully showed Simmons the Walco proposal between 4:52
p.m. on October 12 and 3:00 p.m. on October 15 (which nobody did), Walco suffered no
damages, because Simmons did not need to (and did not) add anything to its proposal to
14

Walco's pricing and terms were publicly disclosed and discussed by Walco with
Walco's consent on October 15, 2012 and further publicly discussed by Walco on and
after October 16, 2012. So that information quickly became generally known and readily
ascertainable and thus could not constitute a "trade secret" as a matter of law as of 3:00
p.m. on October 15.
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it

proposal that accepted far more of the County's tenns at a lower price.

Simmons did not need to "rehabilitate" its proposal. (See Compl.

<j[<J[

24-27.) Simmons

had plainly accepted the material terms of the County's proposed contract with a different
base rate and a per-ton charge for waste in excess of an annual cap. And Idaho County
negotiated better terms (i.e., to Simmons' economic detriment, not its advantage) by
increasing the cap from 4,500 to 4,632 tons. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. R (minutes of
October 30, 2012 meeting, noting Simmons' agreement to increase annual cap to 4,632
tons).)
Walco has no basis to claim that anything occurred in secret, at least nothing of
relevance or materiality that could have caused it damages.

Given the facts, the

disposition of Walco's claim simply does not turn upon whether anyone had any secret
conversation with Simmons, or showed Simmons the Walco proposal, before the public
opening of the proposals at 3:00 p.m. on October 15. Nonetheless, the Commissioners
and Ackerman declare under penalty of perjury that they had no hand in any such
wrongful activity.

(See Ackerman Deel. 19; Brandt Deel.

1[ 6; Chmelik Deel. 16;

Rockwell Decl.16.)
For these reasons, Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment because Walco
cannot establish that any information in its proposal was of independent economic value
and was not generally known or readily ascertainable.
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2.

Walco did not take reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of any
alleged trade secrets contained in its proposal.

Even if W alco could establish the existence of information of independent
economic value, Walco cannot establish that it took "efforts that [were] reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy," § 48-801(5)(b), because Walco (1) took no
efforts to indicate the existence of any trade secrets contained in its proposal,
(2) repeatedly and voluntarily consented to public opening and discussion of its proposal,
and (3) attached its unredacted proposal to its publicly filed Complaint in this case.
a.

Walco did not indicate that its proposal contained trade
secrets.

Walco's proposal on its face fails to meet the requirements of a trade secret as a
matter of law, because it evidences no effort whatsoever to indicate the secrecy of
anything inside of it. See, e.g., SePRO, 839 So. 2d at 783-84. In Idaho, as in Florida,
trade secrets can be exempt from public disclosure.

See Idaho Code § 9-340D(1);

SePRO, 839 So. 2d at 785. But the provision of Idaho law that defines a trade secret for

misappropriation purposes, i.e., Idaho Code § 48-801(5), specifically advises that "trade
secrets" are "subject to disclosure by a public agency" under "chapter 3, title 9, Idaho
Code," the chapter that includes, for example, Idaho's public records law and rules of
evidence. Section 48-801(5) thus places holders of alleged trade secrets on as much
notice as possible that they must take all reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of
alleged trade secrets so that an unknowing public employee does not distribute them.
Given this, SePRO's reasoning has even more force under Idaho law than under Florida
law.
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is especially true for responders to RFPs, because Idaho's public records law
puts responders to RFPs on notice that their proposals are subject to disclosure with only
one exception for trade secrets "contained in" such proposals. See Idaho Code § 9340D(1 ). By limiting the exemption only to those trade secrets contained in a proposal,
the law makes proposals presumptively subject to public disclosure. Just as SePRO
reasons, this makes it even more incumbent upon a responder to an RFP to indicate in
writing, and likely on each page where a trade secret exists, that a portion of the proposal
contains specific trade secrets. Otherwise, the proposer cannot, as a matter of law, have
taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of trade secrets contained in a document
subject to public disclosure - especially where the definition of "trade secret" announces
the possibility of such public disclosure in evidence or in response to a public records
request. See Idaho Code § 48-801(5). 15 Idaho disallows Walco to retroactively declare
information proprietary and place all burden upon public officials to identify Walco' s
"secrets" when Walco did not do so.

15

That Idaho public policy requires this outcome is further evidenced by the immunity
provided to public officials who inadvertently disclose trade secrets in good faith when
responding to public records requests. See Idaho Code § 9-346 ("No public agency or
independent public body corporate and politic, public official, or custodian shall be
liable, nor shall a cause of action exist, for any loss or damage based upon the release of a
public record governed by the provisions of this chapter if the public agency or
independent public body corporate and politic, public official or custodian acted in good
faith in attempting to comply with the provisions of this chapter.").
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b.

Walco repeatedly consented to public discussion of its
proposal.

Walco repeatedly consented to its proposal's public disclosure and discussion
without stating any limitations on what information could be disclosed or discussed. As
detailed above, the Commissioners announced in advance that the proposals, after being
submitted on October 12, would be reviewed on October 15 and discussed in public on
October 16. (See Ackerman Deel. <j[ 5 & Ex. I; Brandt Deel. <j[ 4;, Chmelik Deel. <][ 4;
Rockwell Deel.<][ 4.) Walco then attended both the public opening of the proposals on
October 15 and the public C:ommissioners' meeting on October 16, in each case without
any objection to public discussion of its proposal. Walco only changed its mind and
attempted retroactively to declare its proposal secret once it realized its strategy (i.e.,
suggesting that its contract be put up for bid) had backfired (i.e., someone else had
proposed a better deal on the County's preferred terms). Walco disliked the conciseness
of Simmons' acceptance of the County's terms -

terms that Walco considered onerous

at a price lower than Walco's. But as in Dana, "The RFP did not provide that the

lowest cost proposal, or the most elaborate, would win the contract."' Dana, 124 Idaho at
802, 864 P.2d at 640 (emphasis added). Simmons' concise acceptance of the County's
proposed contract did not transform more elaborate proposals into trade secrets.
c.

Walco attached its proposal to its publicly filed Complaint.

As discussed above, V./alco attached its unredacted proposal to its Complaint. In
addition to destroying any claim that the proposal was of economic value to anyone for
any purpose other than in respect of this one solid waste contract, it is further evidence of
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Walco's utter failure to take any efforts, much less reasonable efforts, to maintain the
secrecy

any information in the proposal.

For all these reasons, Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment on Walco' s
misappropriation claim, because Walco did not make reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of information contained in its proposal.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Idaho County should be granted summary judgment on

all of plaintiff's claims against it and awarded its costs, including its attorneys' fees.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2013.

NTLEY G. STROMBERG
OSHUA D. MCKARCHER
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 31, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Dennis M. Charney
Charney and Associates, PLLC
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
Email: dennischarney@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Walco, Inc.

David Risley
1443 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Email: david@risleylawoffice.com
Attorney for Defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.

_x_
_K_

E-MAIL (to above email addresses)
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX) to (208) 881-0625 and (208) 743-5307

Jo~c~~{__
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Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. Mc Karcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

WALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S
NOTICE OF FILING OF AMENDED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIEF AND
DECLARATIONS

vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Defendant Idaho County files herewith Defendant Idaho County's Amended
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Amended Declaration of
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OF FILING OF AMENDED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BRIEF AND DECLARATIONS
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Kathy

Ackerman, the Amended Declaration of R. Skipper Brandt, the Amended

Declaration of James A. Chmelik, and the Amended Declaration of James M. Rockwell.
(The exhibits attached to Kathy M. Ackerman's declaration are not affected by this

amendment and thus are not filed or served herewith.) Black line comparisons of each
amended document are attached hereto as Exhibit A (Memorandum in Support), Exhibit
B (Ackerman Declaration), Exhibit C (Brandt Declaration), Exhibit D (Chmelik
Declaration), and Exhibit E (Rockwell Declaration).
The original filings in support of summary judgment incorrectly state that Robert
and Sheila Simmons were present at the Commissioners' public meeting on October 15,
2012.

The amendments made in the attached documents correct that error but are

otherwise identical to the original filings and do not affect the legal analysis relevant to
summary judgment.
In addition, the Supplemental Declaration of Kathy M. Ackerman, filed herewith,
explains how the error was made and authenticates additional documents relevant to
summary judgment.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2013.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
By~~--~~~-' NTLEY G. STROMBERG
OSHUA D. MCKARCHER
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
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1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
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Lewiston, ID 8350 I
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ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180

Attorneys/or Defendant Idaho County
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360
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COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
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INTRODUCTION

I.

Plaintiff, Walco, Inc. ('Walco"), was one of two responders to Idaho County's
request for proposals ("RFP") for a solid waste collection contract. Walco claims that
the RFP was actually a request for competitive bids not proposals, that its "bid" was
lowest, and that Idaho County wrongfully disclosed Walco' s proposal to the other
responder, defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. ("Simmons"). Walco thus claims
Idaho County tortiously interfered with its prospective economic expectancy and
misappropriated trade secrets. Idaho County has moved for summary judgment on all
claims.

II.

RELEVANT FACTS
Idaho law permits counties to contract for solid waste collection services directly

with a vendor of the county's choice, with or without using competitive bidding. See
Idaho Code § 31-4403(6); Compl.

110.

Pursuant to this authority, Idaho County for

several decades has contracted for solid waste disposal services exclusively with Walco
and Simmons, each covering different portions of the County.

In 2002, each firm

executed a separate ten-year contract to provide these services from January 1, 2003
through December 31, 2012. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. A, B.) Walco and Idaho County
in 2008 revised their contract retroactive to October 1, 2006 to provide Walco, among
other things, fuel surcharges and an automatic yearly base rate increase based on the
Consumer Price Index.

(See Ackerman Deel. Exs. C and D (two identical recorded

contracts).)
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On July 3 l, 2012, Idaho County and Simmons executed a ten-year renewal
contract effective January 1, 2013 for Simmons' coverage area. (See Ackerman Deel.
Ex. E.) Idaho County and Walco, however, could not agree on certain terms of a ten-year
renewal contract for Walco's coverage area. (See Compl.

,r,r 7-8.)

Walco thus suggested

that Idaho County put the contract out to bid. (Compl. 19; see Ackerman Deel. Ex. F.)
On August 7, 2012, in a final attempt to conclude a contract with Walco, Idaho County
sent Walco a copy of the recently executed Simmons-area agreement, indicating that
Idaho County would be willing to enter a similar contract with Walco for its coverage
area. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. G.) Walco rejected the proposed contract and again
suggested the contract be put out to bid. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. H.)
On September 11, 2012, Idaho County approved publication of a request for
proposals (not a request for bids) with a response deadline of October 12, 2012. (See
Compl.

,r 11 & Ex. A; Ackerman Deel. Exs. I, J.)1

The RFP consisted. of (a) two pages of

general proposal information, (b) 16 pages of a proposed contract with two exhibits, and
(c) two pages of evaluation criteria. (See generally Ackerman Deel. Ex.

J.)2 At this

1

Exhibit A to Walco's Complaint is incomplete. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36
should follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.
2

The County's proposed contract contained, among others, three material terms of
relevance here. First, the County wanted to retain the right to implement a "recycling
surcharge" by which the contractor might in the future rebate the County (on a per-ton
basis) for any reduction in collected waste resulting from the .removal of recyclable
materials from the solid waste stream. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. J, at §§ 11.2, 11.3.)
Second, the County intended to continue to allow for annual base rate increases based on
changes to the Consumer Price Index. (See id at § 7.1.) Third, the County was willing
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meeting, the Commissioners announced publicly that the proposals would be reviewed on
October 15 and discussed at their meeting on October 16. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. I.)
No party objected to the intended public review and discussion of the proposals.
(Ackerman Deel. ,i 5; Brandt Deel.

,r 4; Chmelik Deel. ,r 4; Rockwell Deel. ,i 4.)

On the October 12, 2012 response deadline, the office of Idaho County Recorder,
Kathy Ackerman, received and time stamped two envelopes containing responsive
proposals. (Ackerman Deel. ,i 6.) Simmons hand delivered its unsealed proposal at 3:04
p.m., and Walco hand delivered its sealed proposal at 4:53 p.m. (Id. & Ex. K.) Both
proposals remained in the Recorder's office, and Walco's proposal remained sealed, until
Walco's proposal was unsealed and Simmons' proposal was opened on October 15, 2012
in a public meeting attended by all three County Commissioners, Ackerman, and
representatives of beth Simmons and Walco. (Ackerman Am. Deel.

,r,i 7-8.)

At no time during the October 15 meeting did Walco or any other party object to
the proposals being opened in public and the base price in each proposal being
announced. (Ackerman Am.,___ Decl.

1 8;

Brandt Am,__Decl.

1 5; Chmelik Am_.__Decl. 1 5;

Rockwell Am. Deel. ,i 5.) Walco recorded the 20-minute October 15, 2012 meeting at
which the proposals were opened and publicly discussed. (See Deel. of Counsel Ex. A
( audio recording of October 15, 2012 Commissioner meeting).) The recording reflects
that, after calling the meeting to order, Commissioner Brandt unsealed the proposals in

to continue paying the fuel surcharge agreed to in 2008, provided that the County would,
in turn, continue to receive a fuel credit for decreases to fuel prices. (See id. at§ 7.2.)
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order they were submitted, announced the base price of each, and asked the clerk to
copy the proposals for the Commissioners. (Id at time stamp 1: 15.) Several minutes of

small talk ensued until the clerk returned with photocopies of the proposals. (Id at time
stamp 5: 18 (Commissioner Brandt referring to copies "hot off the press").)

The

Commissioners reviewed the proposals silently for several more minutes until
Commissioner Rockwell began asking questions about the proposals' terms. (Id. at time
stamp 9: 12 (Commissioner Rockwell and Walco representative discussing similarities
and differences between Walco's existing contract and its newly proposed contract).)
The remainder of the meeting was a discussion of key terms of both parties' proposals, all
without ~any party objecting to the discussion occurring in a public meeting-at1d 1.vith
both parties present. (See generally id.) At no point did any Walco representative refuse
to answer questions or request that the Commissioners stop discussing the proposals-i-fl.
the physical presence of Robert Simmons ..:. (See generally id)
The base prices proposed were $77,202 for Simmons and $87,000 for Walco. (See
Ackerman Deel. Exs. L, M.) Simmons' proposal was one page long. (See Compl. ,i 20
& Ex. C; Ackerman Deel. Ex. L.)3 Walco's proposal was more elaborate -

but also

proposed an entirely different contract than the one proposed by the County with its RFP.

3

Simmons proposed a base rate and only one material deviation from the pricing terms
proposed by the Commissioners: an additional per-ton charge for waste exceeding 4,500
tons per year. (See Compl. Ex. C; Ackerman Deel. Ex. L.) Simmons also proposed to
use its own transfer stations, which were not and are not located in Idaho County, where
Walco's transfer stations are located. (See id.)
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1 18;

Ackerman Deel. Ex. M.)4

On October 16, 2012, at a regularly

scheduled public meeting of the County Commissioners, both Simmons and Walco
discussed their proposals at length and in detail, including discussing material terms of
Walco's proposal. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. N.)
Walco tried to persuade the Commissioners to choose its proposal over Simmons'
proposal. 5

At the October 23, 2012 Commissioners' meeting, a lengthy discussion

ensued about the two proposals, after which the Commissioners voted to enter
negotiations with Simmons. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex.

Q.)6

On November 30, 2012, the

4

Walco opted to propose a flat 5% per year "cost of living" increase to its base rate in
lieu of fuel surcharges or increases based upon the Consumer Price Index. (See Compl.
Ex. B-15, at§ 7.1.) Walco thus did not allow for decreases in fuel costs and wanted a 5%
cost-of-living increase even if the relevant Consumer Price Index had changed less than
5%. Most notably, Walco's agreement did not allow for even the possibility of a future
recycling surcharge. (Compare Compl. Ex. B-17, at§ 11.1, with Ackerman Deel. Ex. M,
at §§ 11.2, 11.3.) Walco thus rejected all three of the County's material proposed terms
described above in footnote 2.
5

For example, in an October 22, 2012 letter to Idaho County, Walco's attorney asserted
that Idaho County would pay Simmons more than it would pay Walco, in part because
Simmons' monthly fuel surcharge would be "at least $7,900," which he noted would total
$85,102 when added to Simmons' proposed monthly base rate of $77,202. (See
Ackerman Deel. Ex. 0, at 3.) This stood in contrast to Walco's own recent fuel
surcharges for the same coverage area, which had totaled only $11,556 for the entire
quarter ending September 30, 2012, an average of only $3,852 per month. (See
Ackerman Deel. Ex. P.)
6

Negotiations were conducted in public (except for contract drafting between the parties'
lawyers). At the October 30, 2012 Commissioners' meeting, Simmons, among other
things, agreed to increase its annual tonnage cap from 4,500 tons to 4,632 tons before
triggering a per-ton charge. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. R.) The contract was discussed at
the November 6 and 27 meetings, and at the latter of these nvo, the public was invited to
(and did) comment on the proposed agreement with Simmons and was advised that
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Commissioners approved and executed the contract with Simmons, to take effect on
January 1, 2013. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. U,

V.)7

On January 7, 2013, Walco filed a Notice of Tort Claim, making the same
allegations presented by its Complaint. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. Y.) On February 19,
2013, Idaho County denied the tort claim and explained its reasoning. (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. Z.) Walco filed its Complaint on March 25, 2013. (Compl., at 1.)

III.

ARGUI\/IENT
Walco claims that Idaho County tortiously interfered with an economic

expectancy and misappropriated trade secrets.

Idaho County is entitled to summary

judgment on both claims.

A.

Tortious Interference with an Economic Expectancy

Tortious interference with a prospective economic expectancy has five elements:
(1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference
inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful

copies of the proposed contract were available for review. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. S,
T.)
7

For the first six months of 2013, Idaho County paid Simmons a total of $483,024.40 in
base rate and fuel surcharges under the contract at dispute here. (See Ackerman Deel.
~Wi) 3Z-33 & Exs. W, X.) At Walco's base rate of $87,000 per month (with no fuel
surcharges), the Simmons contract has cost $38,975.60 less than the Walco contract
would have cost for the same period. (Both contracts provided for separate payment for
tires, appliances, and tipping fees, so those charges, totaling $7,257.20, are not included
in this comparison.) In particular, Simmons' fuel surcharges for the first half of 2013
totaled only $19,812.40 (see id) - an average of only $3,302.07 per month and nearly
$4,600 per month less than the $7,900 per month Walco "estimated" that Simmons would
charge. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. 0, at 3 (letter from Walco's attorney).)
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by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (5) resulting
damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.

WescoAutobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,893,243 P.3d 1069, 1081 (2010)
(quoting Cantwellv. City ofBoise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 191 P.3d 205,216 (2008)).
Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment on several independent bases: first,
Idaho County is not a third party to any alleged expectancy; second, Walco cannot
establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy; third, Idaho County did not act
wrongfully; and, fourth, because no expectancy existed after Idaho County's RFP was
published, Idaho County had no knowledge of the existence of any expectancy, did not
interfere with any alleged expectancy, and did not cause Walco to suffer any damages for
the loss of any expectancy.

1.

Idaho Countv is not a third party to W alco' s alleged economic
expectancy.

A tortious interference claim may rest against a third party to the expectancy, but
not the other party to the expectancy:
Deliberately and at his pleasure, one may ordinarily refuse to deal with
another, and the conduct is not regarded as improper, subjecting the actor to
liability. . . . There is no general duty to do business with all who offer
their services, wares or patronage; but there is a general duty not to
interfere intentionally with another's reasonable business expectancies of
trade with third persons, whether or not they are secured by contract, unless
the interference is not improper under the circumstances.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. b (1979) (emphases added), cited in id
§ 766B, cmt. b; see also id. § 766B; Joel E. Smith, Liability of Third Party for

Inteiference with Prospective Contractual Relationship Between TH·o Other Parties, 6
A.LR. 4th 195, §§ l[a], 2.
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Walco's alleged economic expectancy was a contract with Idaho County. As a
matter of law, Idaho County cannot have tortiously interfered with an expectancy of its
own making. Walco cannot state a claim for tortious interference against Idaho County,
because it is not a third party to the expectancy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 766, cmt. b (1979), cited in id. § 766B, cmt. b.

2.

Walco cannot establish the existence of a valid economic
expectancy.

Walco cannot establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy under Idaho
law because Idaho County was not required to and did not seek competitive bids.
Instead, Idaho County proceeded by requesting proposals, and an RFP does not create a
valid economic expectancy in any responder.

In Idaho, the low bidder in a true competitive bidding process may be able to
establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy, because such a low bidder has a
legally enforceable property interest in being awarded the contract bid upon. See Dana,

Larson, Roubal &Assocs. v. Ed. of Comm 'rs of Canyon County, 124 Idaho 794, 798, 864
P.2d 632, 636 (Ct. App. 1993). Unlike competitive bidders, however, responders to an
RFP have "no legitimate claim to the benefit of being awarded a contract," i.e., they have
no valid economic expectancy. See id. at 802, 864 P.2d at 640. "At the most, they ha[ve]
a unilateral expectation," and are "potential bidders only," not actual bidders. Id. at 800,
864 P.2d at 638.
As Dana summanzes, id. at 798-802, 864 P.2d at 636-40,, when a county is
required to seek competitive bids or inadvertently does so, that county is bound by the

DEFENDANT IDi\HO COUNTY'S AMENDED MEMORAJ\TDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SillvfMARY JUDGMENT -9-

mandatory competitive bidding statute.

See Idaho Code §§ 67-2802 and -2806(2).

"when, however, a county is neither required to seek competitive bids nor inadve11ently
does so, that entity may proceed by any other lawful procedure it chooses. See Idaho
Code § 67-2802 ("No provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to preclude the use of
procurement procedures otherwise authorized by law."); Dana, 124 Idaho at 802, 864
P.2d at 640 ("This was not a request for competitive bids, therefore the competitive
bidding statutes did not define the method of operation."). One such lawful procedure is
issuing an RFP. Dana, 124 Idaho at 801-02, 864 P.2d at 639-40.
Thus, a responder to a county's RFP could potentially establish the existence of a
valid economic expectancy only if the county was required to or inadvertently did solicit
competitive bids instead of proposals. Whether an RFP requests proposals or competitive
bids is a question of law: in Dana, the trial court granted, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, summary judgment by interpreting the RFP at issue. Id. at 799-800, 864 P.2d
at 637-38 (analyzing the RFP and concluding, "The RFP here simply was not phrased as
an invitation for competitive bids."). In this case, Idaho County was not required to and
did not seek competitive bids.
First, it was not required to because Idaho Code § 31-4403(6) exempts contracts
for solid waste "services" from competitive bidding requirements. 8 Walco benefitted

8

Walco claims that Idaho County was contracting for an entire solid waste "system,"
which is subject to competitive bidding just like public "buildings." (See Compl. ,i 13
( discussing a "system's" treatment as a public "building" under Idaho Code § 31-4402).)
Idaho County's contract has been for several decades, and still is, for solid waste
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exemption for several decades and negotiated in reliance on it for much of
20

(Compl.

6-7, 10.)

Second, Idaho County did not inadvertently seek competitive bids.

Idaho

County's RFP contained no form of the word "bid." (See Compl. Ex. A; Ackerman Deel.
Ex.

J.)9 The RFP requested "proposals" and promised only that the County would choose

one "proposer" with whom to "begin contract negotiations." (Id.) It nowhere stated that
the lowest "bidder" would be awarded a contract. (Id.) Only one of its many evaluation
criteria was cost-related, and even that criterion indicated that cost was relevant in
relation to how dramatically a proposer modified the County's proposed contract. (Id.)

Dana is directly on point. In Dana, Canyon County, after reviewing all of the
proposals received in response to its RFP, opted to contract directly with one proposer for
his personal consulting services, contracts for which, like solid waste contracts, are
exempt from Idaho's competitive bidding statutes. See Dana, 124 Idaho at 796-97, 801,
864 P.2d at 634-35, 639. Because the statute did not require competitive bidding and the
County had done nothing more or less than it offered to do in its RFP -

e.g., it reserved

"services," i.e., waste collection, not the construction of an entire solid waste "system"
akin to construction of a public "building." Competitive bidding has not been and was
not required.
9

Walco has attached to its Complaint, and thus admitted the existence and contents of,
the RFP at issue here. (Compl. ,i 11 & Ex. A.) Walco's Exhibit A is incomplete,
however. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36 should follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part
of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.
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right to reject any or all bids, see id at 800, 864 P.2d at 638

the Court held the

had not violated the statute or departed from its RFP:
The RFP said nothing more than that if a suitable proposal was submitted, it
would merit further negotiations. The RFP did not provide that the lowest
cost proposal, or the most elaborate, would win the contract. Other criteria
were considered. The respondents exercised their discretion and chose the
individual and proposal they thought best suited the County's needs.

Id. at 802, 864 P.2d at 640. Because Idaho County's RFP invited proposals and not
competitive bids, the RFP, just as in Dana, "was not a request for competitive bids, [and]
therefore the competitive bidding statutes did not define the method of operation." Id.
Walco thus had "[a]t the most, ... a unilateral expectation." Id. at 800, 864 P.2d at 638. 10
For these reasons, Walco cannot establish the first element of its claim because it
cannot establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy.
3.

Idaho Countv did not act wrongfully or violate County Ordinances
12 and 55.

To establish the fourth element of its claim, Walco asserts that Idaho County acted
wrongfully beyond the fact of interference itself by violating County Ordinances 12 and
55, relating to the IO-year contract term and the location of dumpster sites in Idaho

10

In addition, even if Idaho County's RFP had sought competitive bids, Walco's

proposed contract rejected key terms of the County's proposed contract and stated a
higher base rate with automatic 5% annual increases. Walco's own past fuel surcharges
made its self-serving estimate of Simmons' $7,900-per-month fuel surcharge incredible.
See supra note 5. Walco could not possibly have had a valid economic expectancy,
because it did not propose the lowest price. No matter how many times Walco asserts its
counterfactual position, i.e., that "Simmons' bid was, on its face, the more expensive bid"
(see Compl.
21, 27, 39, 45, 47, 48), nothing changes the facts shown by the documents
themselves. See also supra note 7 (noting Simmons' costs for first six months of 2013).
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· (See Compl.

19, 28-29, 49-51.) Idaho County violated neither of these

Ordinances, neither of which is still in effect.
a.

Ordinance 12 and its 5-year contract limitation has been
repealed

Walco alleges that Idaho County violated County Ordinance 12 by proposing and
executing a 10-year contract with Simmons. (Compl. ,i,i 28-29, 49-50.) Ordinance 12,
enacted in 1976, was the County's original solid waste ordinance, and it limited solid
waste contracts to five years' duration. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. AA (Idaho County
Ordinance No. 12) (repealed), at art. V, sec. 18(A) ("No such contract shall exceed five
(5) years' duration.").)

Idaho County has wholly reenacted, with revisions, its solid

waste ordinance several times since 1976. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. BB-DD (Idaho
County Ordinance Nos. 54 (repealed), 55 (repealed), 58).) Even a brief comparison of
each ordinance confirms that each wholesale reenactment substituted for, superseded, and
repealed prior solid waste ordinances. 11 Ordinance 54 expressly repealed Ordinance 12
(among others), and it did not contain any time limitation on contracts. (See Ackerman

11

See Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank ofN.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) ("There are two wellsettled categories of repeals by implication: (1) Where provisions in the two acts are in
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier
act."); see also, e.g., State v. Davidson, 78 Idaho 553, 558-59, 309 P.2d 211,215 (1957)
("The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways is a comprehensive statute,
legislatively intended to cover the whole field and subject matter of the operation of
motor vehicles, including definitions of the several offenses growing out of the improper
operation of such vehicles, prescribing penalties for those offenses, and repealing by
implication all acts and parts of acts inconsistent therewith.").
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Deel. Ex. BB, at 1 & art. IV, sec. 18(A).) And Ordinance 58, the currently effective
ordinance, does not contain any time limitation on solid waste contracts. (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. DD, at art. IV, sec. 18(A).) There is no five-year limitation on solid waste
service contracts in Idaho County.
In addition, three facts lay bare Walco's allegation on this point: (1) Simmons' and
Walco's 2003-2012 contracts with Idaho County were IO-year contracts (see Ackerman
Deel. Exs. A, B); (2) Walco did not complain when Idaho County's RFP was published
with a proposed IO-year contract (see Ackerman Deel. Ex. J, at § 2); and (3) Walco's
own proposal was for a IO-year contract (see Compl. Ex. B-11, at§ 2). Idaho County did
not act wrongfully in executing a IO-year contract with Simmons.
b.

Ordinance 55 does not require transfer stations in Idaho
County.

Walco alleges that Idaho County violated Ordinance 55 because Simmons did not
promise to have a "transfer station" in Idaho County, as allegedly "required by Idaho
County Ordinance 55, Section 11, B. l." (Compl. ,i,r 19, 49, 51.) Walco cites Ordinance
55, which is one of the subsequent reenactments of Ordinance 12 discussed above. But
neither is the current one; Ordinance 58 is the only currently effective solid waste
ordinance. And, regardless, Ordinance 55 never required (and Ordinance 58 does not
require) anyone to maintain a transfer station in Idaho County.
Section 10 of each ordinance addresses "transfer stations" and nowhere requires
they be operated in any particular location. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. DD (Idaho County
Ordinance No. 58), at § 10; see also Ackerman Deel. Ex. CC (Idaho County Ordinance
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No. 55) (repealed), at§ 10.) Section 11, cited by Walco, addresses County residents (not
County or its contractors) and requires them to dispose of trash at "designated
disposal sites or ... available transfer stations throughout the County." (See Ackerman
Deel. Ex. DD (Idaho County Ordinance No. 58), at § 11 (emphasis added); see also
Ackerman Deel. Ex. CC (Idaho County Ordinance No. 55) (repealed), at § 11.)
Residents may use one of Idaho County's several "designated disposal sites" without
violating the ordinance.

Even if Simmons operated transfer stations several counties

away ( or none at all), there would still be no violation of Sections 10 or 11 of Ordinance
58 (or repealed Ordinance 55), because neither requires Idaho County, Simmons, Walco,
or anyone else to maintain a transfer station in Idaho County.
4.

Walco cannot establish the remaining elements of its interference
claim.

Walco cannot establish the second, third, or fifth elememts of its tortious
interference claim. No valid economic expectancy existed after Idaho County published
its RFP. See Dana, 124 Idaho at 800, 802, 864 P.2d at 638, 640.

Therefore, Idaho

County cannot have had knowledge of the existence of any expectancy, cannot have
interfered with any expectancy, and cannot have caused Walco to suffer any damages for
the loss of any expectancy.
For all of the above reasons, Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment on
Walco's tortious interference claim.

DEFE:NDiillT IDAHO COUNTY'S AME1"1DED :MEMORANDUM
1N SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGrvIENT -15-

.iVIisapp:rop:riation of Trade Secrets
The Idaho Trade Secrets Act provides for damages for misappropriation of a trade
secret. See Idaho Code § 48-801 to -807. In Idaho, a "trade secret" is
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use;
and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Idaho Code§ 48-801(5).

12

The plaintiff in a misappropriation suit has the burden to establish first that a trade
secret "actually existed." Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Emest, 149 Idaho 881, 897,
243 P.3d 1069, 1085 (2010); Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734, 992 P.2d

12

Because Idaho has adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and codified the meaning of
"trade secret," the common law factors listed in the Restatement of Torts are now
"helpful guidelines" that "can be used" to assist a court's analysis, but they are "no longer
required to find a trade secret." Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 735, 992 P.2d
175, 184 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those six factors are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside [the plaintiffs]
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in the business; (3) the e:x.i:ent of measures taken by him to guard
the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and
his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in
developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.

Id (quoting Restatement of Torts§ 757, cmt. b (1939)). "All of these factors address the
issue of whether the information in question is generally known or readily ascertainable."
Id
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175, 183 (1999) ("Without a proven trade secret there can be no misappropriation, even i£
the defendants' action was wrongful." (internal quotation marks omitted)). A plaintiff in
a misappropriation suit must also "specify the precise information that it claim[ s] to be
protected trade secrets." Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v KlYJG Am. Corp., Case No. A0S-2079,
2006 WL 2529760, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2006); see also Electro-Craft C01p. v.

Controlled J.vfotion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983) (discussing specificity of
plaintiffs claims), cited with approval in Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 734, 992 P.2d at 183.
A plaintiff must "describe the subject matter of the trade secret with sufficient

particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special
knowledge of those persons skilled in the trade." !max Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152
F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

In sum, as to the first statutory element, see § 48-801(5)(a), a plaintiff must
specify precisely what "information" allegedly has "independent economic value," is not
"generally known," is not "readily ascertainable by proper means" by others, see id., is
not "general knowledge in the trade," and is not "special knowledge of those persons
skilled in the trade," see Imax, 152 F.3d at 1164-65.
As to the second statutory element, see§ 48-801(5)(6), at least one court has held
that a plaintiff cannot be held to have taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of
information where the plaintiff submitted documents to a state agency that was subject to
a public records iaw without marking the documents confidential: "[T]he failure to
identify information furnished to a state agency as putatively exempt from public
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disclosure effectively destroys any confidential character it might otherwise have enjoyed
as a trade secret." SePRO Corp. v. Florida Dep 't of Envtl. Prot., 839 So. 2d 781, 783
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The court reasoned:
The trade secret owner who fails to label a trade secret as such, or otherwise
to specify in writing upon delivery to a state agency that information which
it contends is confidential and exempt under the public records law is not to
be disclosed, has not taken measures or made efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain the information's secrecy.

Id. at 784.
Walco' s misappropriation claim fails on both statutory elements: its proposal
contained no information of independent economic value that was not generally known or
readily ascertainable, and, regardless, it did not take reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of any such information.
1.

W alco' s proposal contained no information of independent of
economic value that was not generally known or readilv
ascertainable.

Nothing in Walco's proposal had "independent economic value" and was not
"generally known" or "readily ascertainable by proper means."
801(5)(a).

Idaho Code § 48-

Walco claims that "[b]ecause Walco had been successfully servicing the

unincorporated areas of Idaho County covered by [its] contract for almost 50 years, [its]
proposal included significant trade secret information."

(Compl. ,I 18.) Walco later

claims that "proprietary business operations outlined in the Walco bid proposal" were
secret. (Comp!.

,r 53.)

These assertions are belied by three independent considerations.
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First, Walco attached to its publicly filed Complaint a full, unredacted copy of the
proposal that allegedly contains trade secrets of value to competitors. (See id & Ex. B.)1 3
This necessarily means that Walco cannot argue that its proposal has sufficient economic
value to anyone for any purpose other than in respect of this one solid waste contract.
Else, why would Walco voluntarily place in the public record the very document that
they insist contains "proprietary business operations"? (Compl.

,r 53.)

One would expect

that proprietary business operations of such economic value as to constitute trade secrets
would also be useful to Vvalco's competitors other than Simmons -

none of whom

Walco has ever alleged had access to its proposal before Walco attached it to its
Complaint. Walco has made its burden tougher: even if it could state a misappropriation
claim (which it cannot), it would have to show that whatever secrets were contained in
the proposal were of value only to, and not generally known or readily ascertainable by,
Simmons -

a competitor who has operated in the same region for several decades

alongside Walco. This is an extraordinary burden, which Walco cannotmeet.
Second, Walco's proposal contains no descriptions of "business operations."
Other than the one page containing Walco's base rate and key contract terms, the
proposal contains highly generalized promotional statements and simple facts about its
business, its clients, its history, and past achievements that Walco believed qualified it to
serve Idaho County. (See generally Ackerman Deel. Ex. M.) Walco's proposed contract

13

Exhibit B to Walco's Complaint is over-inclusive. Exhibit pages B-21 through B-36
should follow Exhibit page A-5 and be a part of Exhibit A and not a part of Exhibit B.
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is substantially the same as the publicly recorded contract it executed with Idaho County
in 2008. (See Ackerman Deel. Exs. C, D.) Walco should be able immediately to detail
for the Court the precise phrases and sentences that are or were allegedly "trade secrets."
Walco cannot claim it cannot do this or that it must be done under seal, because it has
already placed the entire proposal in the public record by attaching it to its Complaint.
Third, even Walco' s one page containing its proposed base rak~ and contract terms
had no "independent economic value" to Simmons between the time it was submitted to
Idaho County at 4:52 p.m. on October 12, 2012 and publicly unsealed at 3:00 p.m. on
October 15. 14 This is necessarily true because (l) Simmons submitted its proposal at
3:04 p.m., nearly two hours before Walco (see Ackerman Deel.

,r 6

& Ex. K),

(2) Simmons did not alter its proposal after it submitted it and before it was opened on
October 15 (Ackerman Deel.

,r,r 7, 9), and (3) all the facts that the Commissioners needed

to choose to negotiate with Simmons were contained in Simmons' straightforward
proposal. Walco's proposal simply did not and does not have the value Walco attaches to
it.
Even if someone wrongfully showed Simmons the Walco proposal between 4:52
p.m. on October 12 and 3:00 p.m. on October 15 (which nobody did), Walco suffered no
damages, because Simmons did not need to (and did not) add anything to its proposal to
14

Walco's pricing and terms were publicly disclosed and discussed by Walco with
Walco's consent on October 15, 2012 and further publicly discussed by Walco on and
after October 16, 2012. So that information quickly became generally known and readily
ascertainable and thus could not constitute a "trade secret" as a matter of law as of 3 :00
p.rn. on October 15.
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make it the proposal that accepted far more of the County's terms at a lower price.
Simmons did not need to "rehabilitate" its proposal. (See Compl.

24-27.) Simmons

had plainly accepted the material terms of the County's proposed contract with a different
base rate and a per-ton charge for waste in excess of an annual cap. And Idaho County
negotiated better terms (i.e., to Simmons' economic detriment, not its advantage) by
increasing the cap from 4,500 to 4,632 tons. (See Ackerman Deel. Ex. R (minutes of
October 30, 2012 meeting, noting Simmons' agreement to increase annual cap to 4,632
tons).)
Walco has no basis to claim that anything occurred in secret, at least nothing of
relevance or materiality that could have caused it damages.

Given the facts, the

disposition of Walco's claim simply does not tum upon whether anyone had any secret
conversation with Simmons, or showed Simmons the Walco proposal, before the public
opening of the proposals at 3:00 p.m. on October 15. Nonetheless, the Commissioners
and Ackerman declare under penalty of perjury that they had no hand in any such
wrongful activity.
Rockwell Deel.

(See Ackerman Deel.

19;

Brandt Deel.

1 6;

Chmelik Deel.

,r 6;

,r 6.)

For these reasons, Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment because Walco
cannot establish that any information in its proposal was of independent economic value
and was not generally knovvn or readily ascertainable.
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2.

Walco did not take reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of any
alleged trade secrets contained in its proposal.

Even if Walco could establish the existence of information of independent
economic value, Walco cannot establish that it took "efforts that [were] reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy," § 48-801(5)(6), because Walco (l)took no
efforts to indicate the existence of any trade secrets contained in its proposal,
(2) repeatedly and voluntarily consented to public opening and discussion of its proposal,
and (3) attached its unredacted proposal to its publicly filed Complaint in this case.
a.

Walco did not indicate that its proposal contained trade
secrets.

Walco's proposal on its face fails to meet the requirements of a trade secret as a
matter of law, because it evidences no effort whatsoever to indicate the secrecy of
anything inside of it. See, e.g., SePRO, 839 So. 2d at 783-84. In Idaho, as in Florida,
trade secrets can be exempt from public disclosure.

See Idaho Code § 9-340D(l);

SePRO, 839 So. 2d at 785. But the provision of Idaho law that defines a trade secret for
misappropriation purposes, i.e., Idaho Code § 48-801( 5), specifically advises that "trade
secrets" are "subject to disclosure by a public agency" under "chapter 3, title 9, Idaho
Code," the chapter that includes, for example, Idaho's public records law and rules of
evidence.

Section 48-801(5) thus places holders of alleged trade secrets on as much

notice as possible that they must take all reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of
alleged trade secrets so that an unknowing public employee does not distribute them,
Given this, SePRO's reasoning has even more force under Idaho lavv than under Florida
Iaw.
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This is especially true for responders to RFPs, because Idaho's public records law
puts responders to RFPs on notice that their proposals are subject to disclosure with only
one exception for trade secrets "contained in" such proposals.

See Idaho Code § 9-

340D(l ). By limiting the exemption only to those trade secrets contained in a proposal,
the law makes proposals presumptively subject to public disclosure.

Just as SePRO

reasons, this makes it even more incumbent upon a responder to an RFP to indicate in
writing, and likely on each page where a trade secret exists, that a portion of the proposal
contains specific trade secrets. Otherwise, the proposer cannot, as a matter of law, have
taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of trade secrets contained in a document
subject to public disclosure -

especially where the definition of "trade secret" announces

the possibility of such public disclosure in evidence or in response to a public records
request. See Idaho Code§ 48-801(5). 15 Idaho disallows Walco to retroactively declare
information proprietary and place all burden upon public officials to identify Walco's
"secrets" when Walco did not do so.

15

That Idaho public policy requires this outcome is further evidenced by the immunity
provided to public officials who inadvertently disclose trade secrets in good faith when
responding to public records requests. See Idaho Code § 9-346 ("No public agency or
independent public body corporate and politic, public official, or custodian shall be
liable, nor shall a cause of action exist, for any loss or damage based upon the release of a
public record governed by the provisions of this chapter if the public agency or
independent public body corporate and politic, public official or custodian acted in good
faith in attempting to comply with the provisions of this chapter.").
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b.

Walco repeatedly consented to public discussion of its
proposal

Walco repeatedly consented to its proposal's public disclosure and discussion
without stating any limitations on what information could be disclosed or discussed. As
detailed above, the Commissioners announced in advance that the proposals, after being
submitted on October 12, would be reviewed on October 15 and discussed in public on
October 16. (See Ackerman Deel. ,i 5 & Ex. I; Brandt Deel.

,r 4;

Chmelik Deel. ,i 4;

Rockwell Deel. ,i 4.) Walco then attended both the public opening of the proposals on
October 15 and the public Commissioners' meeting on October 16, in each case without
any objection to public discussion of its proposal. Walco only changed its mind and
attempted retroactively to declare its proposal secret once it realized its strategy (i.e.,
suggesting that its contract be put up for bid) had backfired (i.e.,. someone else had
proposed a better deal on the County's preferred terms). Walco disliked the conciseness
of Simmons' acceptance of the County's terms -

terms that Walco considered onerous

at a price lower than Walco's. But as in Dana, "The RFP did not provide that the

lowest cost proposal, or the most elaborate, would win the contract." Dana, 124 Idaho at
802, 864 P.2d at 640 (emphasis added). Simmons' concise acceptance of the County's
proposed contract did not transform more elaborate proposals into trade secrets.
c.

Walco attached its proposal to its publicly filed Complaint.

As discussed above, Walco attached its unredacted proposal to its Complaint. In
addition to destroying any claim that the proposal was of economic value to anyone for
any purpose other than in respect of this one solid waste contract, it is further evidence of

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S A\!IBNDED Jv[EMORANDU1v1
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUtv.11v1ARY JUDG]V[ENT -24-

Walco's utter failure to take any efforts, much less reasonable efforts, to maintain the
secrecy of any information in the proposal.
For all these reasons, Idaho County is entitled to summary judgment on Walco' s
misappropriation claim, because Walco did not make reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of information contained in its proposal.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Idaho County should be granted summary judgment on
all of plaintiffs claims against it and awarded its costs, including its attorneys' fees.
DATED this 2-+th31 st day of SepternberOctober, 2013.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
By _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
BENTLEY G. STROMBERG
JOSHUA D. MCKARCHER
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County

DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTY'S AMENDED lvIBMORANDUM
W SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUJ'v1MARY JUDGMENT -25-

Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff,
AMENDED DECLARATION OF
KA THY M. ACKERMAN

vs.

COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, KATHY M. ACKERMAN hereby declares:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.
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2.

I am now, and have been since January 11, 2011, employed as the Clerk of

the District Court ex officio Auditor/Recorder for Idaho County and Clerk for the Board
of Idaho County Commissioners.
3.

The documents attached hereto as Exhibits A through DD are true and

correct copies of records of regularly conducted business activity of Idaho County and its
employees which were made or received at or near the time of the events referenced,
described or depicted in those Exhibits, and which were made or received and kept in the
course of the regularly conducted business activity of Idaho County.
4.

In this declaration, unless the context requires otherwise, "Wako" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
"RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and "proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the
RFP.
5.

On September 11, 2012, I attended and took the minutes of the public

Commissioners' meeting, at which the Commissioners voted to approve the RFP
publication, with responses due by 5 :00 p.m. on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no
person lodged an objection to responses to the RFP being opened in public on October
15, 2012 and discussed at the public Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
6.

On October 12, 2012, just after 3 :00 p.m. in the afternoon, I witnessed

Robert Simmons of Simmons hand deliver an unsealed envelope to Debra Todd, an
employee in my office who sits in my immediate vicinity. I watched Debra immediately
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stamp

envelope with the date and time of day and hand the envelope to me. Later that

same day, shortly before 5:00 p.m. in the afternoon, I witnessed 1vfarietta Holman of
Walco hand deliver a sealed envelope to Ms. Todd. I watched Debra immediately stamp
the envelope with the date and time of day and hand the envelope to me. Neither Mr.
Simmons nor Ms. Holman stated or otherwise indicated to Ms. Todd or me that his or her
envelope contained a trade secret or proprietary information.
7.

Immediately after each envelope's delivery, I personally placed each

envelope in my desk drawer in a file I had created for responses to the RFP. To the best
of my knowledge, no person touched, viewed, or removed the envelopes from my desk
drawer until I personally removed them just before 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, to
carry them to the public Idaho County Commissioners' meeting at which they were first
opened.
8.

At 3 :00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners'

meeting and witnessed Commissioner Skip Brandt open the two envelopes I gave to him
that contained the proposals. All three Commissioners, plus Robert Simmons, Sheila
S-i-mmens-,Patrick Holman, and Marietta Holman attended the meeting. No party present
at the meeting objected to the proposals being opened and the proposed base rates being
announced in public, and no party present requested that any portion of either proposal be
considered a trade secret.
9.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of

either proposal or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.
Among other things, I did not look at either proposal, did not give either proposal to any
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person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either proposal to any other
person, ai.7.d did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any other person. The
first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.
10.

Exhibit A is a copy of Simmons' contract with Idaho County effective

Januaiy 1, 2003, recorded in Idaho County as document number 425769.
11.

Exhibit B is a copy of Walco' s contract with Idaho County effective

Januaiy 1, 2003, recorded in Idaho County as document number 425770.
12.

Exhibit C is the first recorded copy of Walco' s contract with Idaho County

effective October 1, 2006, recorded in Idaho County as document number 461073.
13.

Exhibit D is the second recorded copy of W alco' s contract with Idaho

County effective October 1, 2006, recorded in Idaho County as document number
461972.
14.

Exhibit E is a copy of Simmons' renewal contract with Idaho County

effective Jari.uaiy 1, 2013, recorded in Idaho County as document number 485052.
15.

Exhibit F is a copy of a letter dated June 7, 2012, from Walco's attorney,

Dennis Charney.
16.

Exhibit G is a copy of a letter dated August 7, 2012, sent to Walco's

attorney, Dennis Charney.
17.

Exhibit H is a copy of an email chain showing emails exchanged with

Walco's attorney, Dennis Charney, between August 8, 2012 and August 14, 2012.
18.

Exhibit I is a copy of the minutes of the September 11, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
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19.

Exhibit J is a copy of the RFP.

20.

Exhibit K. is a copy of two envelopes delivered to and time-stamped by my

office on October 12, 2012.

When later unsealed, I observed that each envelope

contained the proposal of the entity named on the outside of the envelope.
21.

Exhibit L is a copy of Simmons' proposal.

22.

Exhibit Mis a copy ofWalco's proposal.

23.

Exhibit N is a copy of the minutes of the October 16, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
24.

Exhibit O is a copy of a letter dated October 22, 2012, received from

Walco's attorney, Dennis Charney.
25.

Exhibit P is a copy of Walco's invoice for fuel surcharges for the period

from July 1, 2012 through September 30, 2012.
26.

Exhibit Q is a copy of the minutes of the October 23, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
27.

Exhibit R is a copy of the minutes of the October 30, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
28.

Exhibit S is a copy of the minutes of the November 6, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
29.

Exhibit Tis a copy of the minutes of the November 27, 2012 meeting of the

Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
30.

Exhibit U is a copy of the minutes of the November 30, 2012 meeting of

the Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
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31.

Exhibit V is a copy of Simmons' contract with Idaho County (resulting

from its proposal) effective January 1, 2013, recorded in Idaho County as document
numbers 486636 and 486674.
32.

Exhibit Wis a true and correct copy of the invoices submitted by Simmons

for services provided from January 1, 2013 through March 31, 2013 pursuant to the solid
waste services contract resulting from its proposal. Exclusive of $3,708.50 of charges
payable for tires and appliances, I caused Idaho County to approve and pay Simmons
$240,561.70 for base rate and fuel surcharges for this period, consisting of three monthly

service payments of $77,202, plus one payment for fuel surcharges of $8,955.70.
33.

Exhibit Xis a true and correct copy of the invoices submitted by Simmons

for services provided from April 1, 2013 through June 30, 2013 pursuant to the solid
waste services contract resulting from its proposal. Exclusive of $3,548.70 of charges
payable for tires and appliances, I caused Idaho County to approve and pay Simmons
$242,462.70 for base rate and fuel surcharges for the noted period, consisting of three

monthly service payments of $77,202, plus one payment for fuel surcharges of
$10,856.70.
34.

Exhibit Y is a copy of Walco's Notice of Tort Claim filed on or about

January 7, 2013.
35.

Exhibit Z is a copy of a letter dated February 19, 2013, sent to Walco's

attorney, Dennis Charney.
36.

Exhibit AA is a copy of Idaho County Ordinance No. 12.
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37.

Exhibit BB is a copy of Idaho County Ordinance No. 54, recorded in Idaho

County as document number 450565.
38.

Exhibit CC is a copy of Idaho County Ordinance No. 55, recorded in Idaho

County as document number 457276.

39.

Exhibit DD is a copy of Idaho County Ordinance No. 58, recorded in Idaho

County as document number 469773.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

DATE
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Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

Case No. CV-2013-42360

W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
R. SKIPPER BRANDT

vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and

SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, R. SKIPPER BRANDT hereby declares:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.
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2.

I am now, and have been since March 19, 2007, a duly-appointed or -

elected member of the Idaho County Board of Commissioners. I served as Chairman
from January 12, 2009 to January 15, 2013.
3.

In this declaration, unless the context requires otherwise, "Walco" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
"RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and "proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the
RFP.

4.

On September 11, 2012, I attended and presided over the public

Commissioners' meeting at which I voted to approve the RFP for publication, with
responses to be due by 5:00 p.m. on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no person lodged
an objection to responses to the RFP being opened in public on October 15, 2012 and
discussed at the public Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
5.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended and presided over the public

Commissioners' meeting at which I personally opened two envelopes containing the
proposals. I first opened Simmons' envelope and announced the proposed base rate
appearing inside.

I then unsealed and opened Walco' s envelope and announced the

proposed base rate appearing inside. All three Commissioners, plus Kathy Ackerman,
Ro~)ert Simmons, Sheila Simmons, Patrick Holman, and Marietta Holman attended the
meeting. No party present at the meeting objected to the proposals being opened and the
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proposed base rates being announced in public, and no party present requested that any
portion of either proposal be considered a trade secret.
6.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of

either proposal or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.
Among other things, I did not ask to see or see either proposal, did not give either
proposal to any other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either
proposal to any other person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any
other person. The first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the

foregoing is true and correct.

DATE

A?v1ENDED DECLARATION OF
R. SKIPPER BRANDT

R. SKIPPER BRANDT
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Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. Mc Karcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180

Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

Case No. CV-2013-42360

W ALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES A. CHMELIK

vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406, JAMES A. CHMELIK hereby declares:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.
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2.

I am now, and have been since January 11, 2011, a duly-elected member of

the Idaho County Board of Commissioners.
3.

In this declaration, unless the context requires otherwise, "Wako" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
"RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and "proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the
RFP.

4.

On September 11, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners' meeting at

which I voted to approve the RFP for publication, with responses to be due by 5:00 p.rn.
on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no person lodged an objection to responses to the
RFP being opened in public on October 15, 2012 and discussed at the public

Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
5.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners'

meeting at which Commissioner Brandt opened two envelopes containing the proposals.
He first opened Simmons' envelope and announced the proposed base rate appearing
inside. He then unsealed and opened Walco' s envelope and announced the proposed base
rate appearing inside. All three Commissioners, plus Kathy Ackerman, Robert Simmons,
~-H:1'l:ffiElfi&;-Patrick Holman, and Marietta Holman attended the meeting. No party
present at the meeting objected to the proposals being opened and the proposed base rates
being announced in public, and no party present requested that any portion of either
proposal be considered a trade secret.
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6.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of

either proposal or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.
Among other things, I did not ask to see or see either proposal, did not give either
proposal to any other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either
proposal to any other person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any
other person. The first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

DATE

AVl ENDED DECLARATION OF
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I

Bentley G. Stromberg
Joshua D. McKarcher
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 3737
ISB No. 9180

Attorneys for Defendant Idaho County

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICW'..., DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

WALCO, INC., an Idaho corporation,

Case No. CV-2013-42360

Plaintiff,

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES M. ROCKWELL

vs.
COUNTY OF IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;

and
SIMMONS SANITATION SERVICE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406, JAMES M. ROCKWELL hereby declares:

1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States, competent to testify as a witness

and make this declaration on personal knowledge.
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2.

I am now, and have been since Janua~ 12, 2009, a duly-elected member of

the Idaho County Board of Commissioners. I have served as Chairman since January 15,
2013.
3.

In this declaration, unless the context requires otherwise, "Walco" means

plaintiff Walco, Inc.; "Simmons" means defendant Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc.;
"RFP" means the request for proposals approved for publication by the Idaho County
Board of Commissioners on September 11, 2012 and related to a solid waste services
contract; and "proposal" means Walco's or Simmons' October 12, 2012 response to the
RFP.
4.

On September 11, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners' meeting at

which I voted to approve the RFP for publication, with responses to be due by 5 :00 p.m.
on October 12, 2012. At that meeting no person lodged an objection to responses to the
RFP being opened in public on October 15, 2012 and discussed at the public
Commissioners' meeting on October 16, 2012.
5.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, I attended the public Commissioners'

meeting at which Commissioner Brandt opened two envelopes containing the proposals.
He first opened Simmons' envelope and announced the proposed base rate appearing
inside. He then unsealed and opened W alco' s envelope and announced the proposed base
rate appearing inside. All three Commissioners, plus Kathy Ackerman, R-ooert Simn-rBBB-;&!:icila Simmon:.;, Patrick Holman, and Marietta Holman attended the meeting. No party
present at the meeting objected to the proposals being opened and the proposed base rates
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being announced in public, and no party present requested that any portion of either
proposal be considered a trade secret.

6.

Prior to the October 15 meeting, I took no action to learn the contents of

either proposal or to assist anyone else in learning the contents of either proposal.
Among other things, I did not ask to see or see either proposal, did not give either
proposal to any other person, did not ask any other person to give a copy of either
proposal to any other person, and did not discuss the contents of either proposal with any
other person. The first time I saw either proposal was at the October 15 meeting.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

DATE

AMENDED DECLARATION OF
JAMES M. ROCKWELL

JAMES M. ROCKWELL
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